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CHAPTER

I

PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY TODAY: THE STATE OF THE FIELD
Not long ago when

I

sat as a graduate students' rep-

resentative to the psychology department's executive
committee

I

was impressed by a faculty member's remark

about upgrading the requirements of our undergraduate
majors. More "rigor" was in order to produce first-rate

candidates for graduate study and professional careers,
he made clear.

"We should require more courses in other

fields related to psychology? they should take more physics,

more chemistry, more calculus." In the discussion that

followed no one mentioned more sociology, philosophy, or
literature courses. No vote was taken, but

I

left the

meeting vaguely dissatisfied.
The suspicion that my personal conception of psych-

ology was not universally upheld in the field was

heightened not long afterwards over lunch with a researcher
whose specialty involved implanting brain lesions in mice.
"Oh,

come on," she said with impatience,

"nobody does

psychology anymore. Psychology is dead." Her point, if
I

understood her, was to differentiate psychology from

behavioral science. Concerned as it was with "unscientific"
notions about mental life, psychology was obsolete; anything

worth salvaging could be incorporated into the broadening
field of neuroscience

What psychologists say over lunch is not always

implemented back at the office, so it is worth noting that
at the department where she now teaches

— and

among her

classes is the introductory course--she recently recommended
that no one be hired to replace the single personality-

clinical psychologist who had left. He had taught the
theories of personality course.
These examples, which can be multiplied, suggest at

least superficially that contemporary American academic

psychology has excluded from its rigorous examination most
of what the non-specialist imagines psychologists know

and think about. Instructors of introductory psychology
courses are familiar with the gap between students* anticipations, their hopes of understanding themselves and

resolving, finally, the puzzle of human nature, and the
contents of academic psychology, replete with normal curves,
Nodes of Ranvier, Lashley jumping stands, fixed-ratio

reinforcement schedules, and so on. It is easy, too, to
understand the blank reactions of lay readers who devour

with interest books like Passages
Politi cs of Experience

,

,

Denia l of D eath

,

The

and Becoming Partners when con-

fronted with the table of contents of such professional

publications as The Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, Consider the first paragraph from a paper with
an uncommonly promising title,

"Toward a Causal Model of Lov

3

by Tesser and Paulhus (1976):
Some recent work demonstrates that thought
about some person, thing, or idea increases
the likelihood that one's attitude will polarize (e.g., Sadler & Tesser, 1973; Tesser^&
Conlee, 1975). Perhaps this effect occurs
because thought alters one's salient cognitions,
making them more consistent with the initial
attitude. Since affect is related to cognitions,
thought polarizes attitudes. Given that persons
like those they date, thinking will lead to the
generation of favorable attributes (Tesser &
Cowan, in press). Thus, the more thought about
a previous date, the greater the resulting love
for that date. Reciprocally, we assume that
extremity of feeling about some object increases
the likelihood of its being thought about. In
the present context, then, thought about a date
should be a positive function of one's love for
that date.
P. 1095
^

But if laymen draw a blank at such prose, academic

psychologists are rarely chagrined, needing only to remind
themselves of the lay public's naivete about scientific
psychology. And there is some reason to this view, for

psychology is not obligated by the preconceptions or
needs of non-specialists.

Among personality psychologists, though, there is
another, additional reaction, and that is to lay the chief
ills upon the shoulders of research psychologists in the

other specialties, especially the behaviorists

.

It is

they

whose reductionism trivializes and dehumanizes psychology.
Personality psychologists— and

I

have counted myself one

for seven years— probably derive a sense of professional

solidarity and group identification simply out of our shared
we
sense of being unlike them, those behaviorists. Because

utilize a class of variables eschewed by our
rat-running
colleagues, our "inner," personality variables,
we see ourselves somewhat as champions of freedom and
dignity.
But the crisis of relevance in psychology cannot
com-

placently be laid on the behaviorist doorstep and simply
forgotten, while we pursue personality research, for per-

sonality psychology itself is open to claims of triviality,

irrelevance--of turning its back upon its proper subject
matter. Students in introductory courses in personality
are not immune from feeling, several weeks into the course,

that they have mistaken their room assignments and have

accidentally sat in on some other course.

I

have encountered

students who, having survived the introductory psychology
course with some interest intact and expecting to get to
the heart of the matter with personality studies, react

with the same blank shock to the research work published
in the Journal of Personality

.

What do such neophytes,

interested in what it means to be a person, make of such
titles as these, the lead articles from the four issues of
that journal's forty-fourth volume:
The Verbal Communication of Inconsistency
Between Attitudes Held and Attitudes
Expressed (Wagner and Pease, 1976)

Measurement and Generality of Response
Dispositions in Person Perception
(Kaplan, 1976)

Status Inconsistency, Aggressive Attitude,
and Helping Behavior (Midlarsky and Midlarsky, 1976)

.
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Expressive Control and the Leakage of
Dispositional Introversion-Extraversion
During Role-Playing Teaching (Lippa, 1976).

Speaking of the ills of his own field, the eminent sociologist Peter Berger (I963) writes:
It remains true... that a goodly part of the

sociological enterprise in this country continues to consist of little studies of
obscure fragments of social life, irrelevant
to any broader theoretical concern. One glance
at the table of contents of the major sociological journals or at the list of papers read
at sociological conventions will confirm this
statement
P.

9

Might not the same comment be made concerning personality

psychology today?
But if contemporary academic personality psychology is

undergoing a crisis of relevance, the fact will not successfully be proven to today's researchers simply on the
basis of laymen's and students' shocked reactions. Yet

indications exist within the field itself.
When

I

began graduate study

I

was invited to accom-

pany a professor of personality to address an assembly of
undergraduates interested in psychology careers. When asked
to explain exactly what personality psychology was aboux,

he replied in terms which at the time surprised me. Per-

sonality, he began, contains so many different topics that
it is difficult to see how to define it at all.

It is

really a miscellany, he continued; if you do not fit
anywhere else in psychology, you probably belong in
personality.

.

Sitting there listening,

I

thought he had misspoken.

Anyone with even a sketchy knowledge of the field should

know that personality psychology was that branch of psych-

ology which took the person as a whole as its major unit
of analysis, whose emphases included understanding normal

functioning as well as development, and whose overall
scientific goal was an adequate conceptualization of personhood.

Surely any of the classical personality psych-

ologists, say, Allport or Murray, would have replied in such

terms as these.
Three years have now passed, and

I

have revised my view

considerably on the basis of my greater familiarity with the
field. The professor was correct in describing it as a

hodge podge of unrelated researches, unalloyed by much of an

integrating theoretical umbrella: a miscellany, if you will.
The transformation from the classical conception of the

field into the contemporary description suggests something
drastic has taken place, that something certainly has gone

awry
My experiences as a teaching assistant to professors

giving personality courses at three colleges have contributed to my own sense of crisis. The contrast between two
of these courses, which ran during the same semester, struck
me forcibly.

In one the professor began his lectures by

stating that while personality courses in the oast have

typically presented a series of personality theories,
his
own course would not discuss them "because
research
has

proven them to be inaccurate representations of human

beings." The other course, taught by a practicing
clinical
psychologist, not a personality psychologist, devoted
most of its lectures to the presentation of a series of

personality theories, dynamic, phenomenological, traitoriented, and so on, the professor. drawing frequently upon

his clinical experiences to illustrate how well some of the

theories promote an understanding of persons.
That a professor of personality can without qualms

delete significant discussion of personality theorists

from his lectures in 1977 is really not so extraordinary,
given other trends within the field. While some recent text
such as the second edition of Hall and Lindzey's Theories
of Personality (1970) are almost, entirely devoted to the

discussion of personality theories, today's trend is toward
greater emphasis upon research and techniques. Mischel's
(1971) text

Introduction to Pers onali ty serves as one

example.
The prestigious Jou.

.:al

of Personality published

during the year 1976 forty articles, containing 305 references.

Of these 805,

only 35 are to what liberally might

be considered theoretical sources. Of these 35 references,

77^_-twenty-seven citations

— are

to three theorists alone:

Rotter (13), Kohlberg (9), and Piaget (5). Freud is citad
in one paper only, and no references are made at all to

.
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the theoretical writings of Allport, Erikson, Kelly,

Maslow, or Murray, to list some of the most obvious

omissions
No one will argue with the assertion that the role of

general theory in contemporary academic personality psychology has dwindled, but plenty of room for disagreement
exists over the significance of the loss. The case can be
made that the loss is symptomatic of the field's growing

irrelevance to any understanding of personhood, in the
sense of some human nature. The seemingly outmoded theories

have tended to depict the person as an indivisible unit
of analysis, as multifaceted and complex, yet organized.
The loss of theory has gone hand in hand with the increase

in research employing one or a handful of personality

variables, research in personality fragments which add up neito

ther

a theory of personality nor to persons themselves.

Do general theories of personality contribute to the

understanding of persons? A partial answer is suggested by
the experience of graduate students in a seminar involving
its participants in interviews with under graduate subjects.

The idea behind this seminar, of allowing personality grad-

uate students to conduct research consisting chiefly in

confronting another human being as such, met with some

1

do not mean to say that all personality theories
are inherently holistic or non-reductionistic however
reductionistic some maybe (e.g., Cattell's theory), they
focus on the overall organization or personality and
provide a sense of personhood.
I

;

9

initial resistance on the part of the personality area,
and

seminar members were required to include a formidable bat-

tery of psychometric devices to insure objectivity and
scientific rigor. For many of the participants, this experience was their first in interviewing.

What happened? While all of the graduate students were

aware of the mechanical ease of doing questionnaire or
simple experimental research, and of producing the kinds
of studies that fill current journals, the 'unusual exper-

ience of being confronted with human beings in their own

terms forced us back time after time to the very terminologies that "research has proven... to be inaccurate rep-

resentations of human beings." The frame of mind embodied
by much current research, oriented as it is toward the

quantification of discrete personality variables, proved
unsatisfying in the face of the complexity of nuance we
encountered in our subjects* lives, and to the surprise of
some we frequently employed loosely-psychoanalytic dynamic

theory to arrive at some significant understanding.
The discrepancy between the conceptualisations sug-

gested by the rare exposure to interviewing research and
the conceptualizations that arise from the vastly more

typical paper-and-pencil or experimental designs was hard
to miss; it suggests much about the effect of virtually

banishing general theories from contemporary personality
psychology.

10
In the last few pages

I

have argued the case that the

dwindling influence of general theories has contributed to
the crisis of irrelevance in personality psychology today,

but what remains to be shown is that the kind of research
and conceptualizing that has taken its place is itself

unsatisfactory. But what might constitute sufficient proof
is not clear to me.

On one hand, contemporary work in personality psych-

ology has led to fruitful applications. Employee selection
in industry and government has benefitted both from the

personality tests and general psychometric expertise of

personality psychologists. The Massachusetts Civil Service,
for example, has employed to my knowledge both Cattell's
16 Personal Factors Inventory and the California Psycholog-

ical Inventory to select police and fire-fighter personnel.

I

have recently heard that the General Motors corpor-

ation is seeking

psychologists to aid in the identification

and selection of, presumably, more productive workers.
On the other hand, as

I

have suggested, the great pop-

ularity of bookstore psychology, rarely the product of the
academic psychological community, in contrast to the
sanctvirtual immunity of lay readers to the publications
is testiioned by the American Psychological Association,
to the needs
mony to how little we have addressed ourselves

self-understanding
of the common man in his efforts toward
fruits of academic
and adjustment. For the most part, the

.
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personality psychology in recent years have been largely
irrelevant to the concerns of the proverbial man on the
street
But there is restiveness, too, away from the street;

restiveness in the offices of some personality researchers.
On several occasions professors have privately confided

their opinions that for the most part the contents of the
journals are "trivial," and "not worth reading." Once when
I

proposed an independent study consisting of catching up

on some of the recent journal issues,

I

was advised that

such an effort would be "a waste of time." And once a

professor who had taught personality at Harvard, in reference to current research conventions, quipped that "most

psychologists couldn't verify the existence of their noses."
Not all the criticisms are privately expressed. A

number of writers, both within psychology and within

academia in general, have levied the charge of triviality
and irrelevance against contemporary psychology. Peter

Berger (1963), whose critical examination of sociology
is itself richly suggestive of problems within psychology,

identifies psychologists' historical concern with their
status as scientists as a cause of trivial findings:
At the same time it is quite true that some
sociologists, especially in America, have become so preoccupied with methodological
questions that they have ceased to be interested in society at all. As a result, they
have found nothing of significance about any

12

aspect of social life, since in science as in
love a concentration on technique is quite likely
to lead to impotence. Much of this fixation on
methodology can be explained in terms of the urge
of a relatively new discipline to find acceptance on the academic scene. Since science is an
almost sacred entity among Americans in general
and American academecians in particular, the
desire to emulate the procedures of the older
natural sciences is very strong among the newcomers in the marketplace of erudition. Giving
in to this desire, the experimental psychologists, for instance, have succeeded to such an
extent that their studies have commonly nothing
more to do with anything that human "beings are
or do. The irony of this process lies in the
fact that natural scientists themselves have been
giving up the very positivistic dogmatism that
their emulators are still straining to adopt.
P.

Although

I

13

disagree with the implication that there

is any single process that can be labelled science,

at

least to the extent of wishing to suggest that the problem

may not be that psychologists are too scientific so much
conception
as they give their allegiance to an ill-fitting

between
of science, the relation Berger points out, that

psychology's "fixation on methodology" and its putative
irrelevance, is certainly crucial, and will be discussed
in subsequent chapters.

The insight is reiterated in

these remarks of Noam Chomsky (1965):
One may ask whether the necessity for
present day linguistics to give such priority to introspective evidence and to the
linguistic intuition of the native speaker
The
excludes it from the domain of science.
answer to this seemingly terminological on
question seems to have no bearing at all how
any serious issue. At most, it determines
that can
we shall denote the kind of research
state
effectively carried out in the present
m

be
However,
of our technique and understanding.

.
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this terminological question actually does
relate to a different issue of some interest,
namely the question whether the important
feature of the successful sciences has been
their search for insight or their concern for
objectivity. The social and behavioral sciences
provide ample evidence that objectivity can be
pursued with little consequent gain in insight
and understanding. On the other hand, a good
case can be made for the view that the natural
sciences have, by and large, sought objectivity
primarily insofar as it is a tool for gaining
insight (for providing phenomena that can suggest or test deeper explanatory hypotheses).
p.

20

Noteworthy in Chomsky's statement is the implication
that it is possible to define and then conduct science in
such a way that one's ultimate results lack "insight and

understanding," however "objective" the procedures may
seem. That this is the case in contemporary psychology will
be argued in subsequent discussion. A second implication

that anticipates later discussion concerns the distinction

between determining one's investigative procedures by the
"demands" of one's subject matter and determining them to

conform to an externally imposed recipe purporting to be
scientific
Criticisms of psychology are not restricted to
psycholscholars from neighboring fields. The British
ogist Liam Hudson (1973) notes:
The discipline's health is suspect: as
Zangwill remarked, it has failed to produce
a coherent body of scientific law; and its
air
fruits, unmistakably, have about them an
psychologof triviality. Attempts to justify
utility at
ical research in terms of social
is
present lead inexorably to bathos. There

:

.
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little we have produced in the last fifty years
that is, in any sense of that complex word,
'relevant*
.

.

p.

Ill

Speaking more directly of the field of personality, James
Deese (1972) echoes Chomsky and Berger's charge identifying

psychological research methods as the source of the

problem
One reason so much current empirical research
is trivial and pointless is that the experimental method is inapplicable to many problems
in social psychology and the psychology of

personality.
p.

24

Deese believes that "much of the fundamental study of pers-

onality within the framework of the traditional scientific

view is empirical and relatively shallow"

(p.

92).

To this small collection of critical statements in

reference to the standard research of academic psychology
in general and of personality psychology in particular,

many more could be added. One thinks of Rae Carlson's (1971)
paper,

"Where is the Person in Personality Research?," a

critique which in its essentials scarcely differs from
those Allport consistently makes in his reviews of the

field (cf., 1961).
Yet the very fact that such journals as Journal of

Personality and Social Psycholo gy and the Journal of Per-

sonality continue to be avalanched by the papers of eager

researchers suggests that many psychologists to this day

15

consider research conducted along present lines worth
doing. 2 Certainly in our field it may be said that he who

publisheth, surviveth; but, beyond that, there are those

who have no complaints about the field today. How can the

diversity of reactions to the state of research be ex-

plained? How can we understand the complaints of some and
the complacency of others?

Although contemporary personality psychologists participate in the same field, their perceptions vary according to their own positions within it. Some researchers have

made a greater commitment of both time and selves and have,
one may suppose, a greater stake in upholding current

practices. Some may have had experiences that were especi-

ally disillusioning. The judgement one arrives at regarding
the importance, worth, and relevance of contemporary

psychological research is likely, in the end, to be a function of one's experiences and position in the field.
My own judgements, of course, are subject to the same

kind of influence.

I,

too,

survey the field from a vantage

point that represents my own personal coordinates of
experience and position. Some statement pinpointing these

Submission of research manuscripts need not in itself
indicate much enthusiasm for the kinds of research currently
undertaken. As long as hiring and promotion decisions
reflect amount of publications, career-minded scholars are
compelled to comply with editorial policy. Moreover, some
graduate departments maintain the conservative tradition
of insisting upon quantitative, empirical research projects
for degree candidates.

3
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is in order.

Speaking of the "significant learnings" of

his lifetime as a psychotherapist, Carl Rogers (1961)

includes the statement,

general"

(p.

26);

"What is most personal is most

am increasingly confident that my own

I

perceptions are neither idiosyncratic nor unique, but
perhaps somewhat common.
In retrospect

I

can see that my socialization within

the field had encouraged the formulation of a construct

system (cf., Kelly, 1955) that could not adequately accomodate my genuine experience as a human being. The concepts

and language

years since

I
I

had painstakingly mastered in the ten or so

undertook the formal study of psychology

had left me increasingly estranged from myself. The

acquired experiential categories were alien to the actual
"fully

experiences of being, for lack of better terms,

human." Being by nature serious about my work,

I

tried and

to a considerable extent succeeded in squeezing my percept-

ions—of self and others— into

the ill-fitting shoe my

socialized conceptualization of personhood demanded.
I

had, to overstate the case a bit, quantified my soul

to the point of losing it.

By laying the chief blame upon the distorting capacity
of psychology's constructs, I neglect the possibility of a
pre-existing "fit" between the personality or emotional needs
of
of a researcher— perhaps my own, too— and the world view
academic psychology. Perhaps certain persons are drawn to
nuncn
the realitv illumined by psychology's constructs? My
would
is there are, and research done into this matter
add to our understanding of the variations in the perceptions of crisis in the field, as well as of the prospects
for change.
3
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reached a point where

I

I

simultaneously viewed myself

vainly as a reasonably well functioning person in terms of
my scholarly understanding of personality, and as emot-

ionally deadened. It gradually dawned on me that the models
of personhood implicit in current personality formulations,
so amenable to codification and quantification,

so readily

processable by complicated and elegant statistical tests,
were incompatible with a deep and rich inner experience.
If the

realization

I

am describing recalls the exper-

ience of the graduate seminar build around the direct inter-

viewing of undergraduate subjects,

I

would not be surprised

for among the personal experiences which brought me to the

brink of insight was the life-history interviews

I

con-

ducted of forty-year-old divorced women, under the auspices
of the sociologist Alice

S.

Rossi.

One of these women, describing the break up of her

marriage, spoke of her trip to Europe with her stock broker

husband. Day-dreaming of travelling together on a vespa,

vagabonding from pension to pension

,

she found herself

instead shuttling between jet and taxi, taxi and luxurious
hotel.

Something inside did not fit; something inside

snapped. She finally told her husband,
I'm going home.
The phrase

I

"I'm leaving you.

feel I'm living a lie."

"living a lie" would not leave me.

It took

up residence within me, a kind of inner voice that forced
me into a confrontation with my own existence. The inti-

mate contact

I

made with my subjects' lives, ordinary in

18

some demographic senses, completely more vibrant than my own,

shook me up emotionally and intellectually, and forced upon
me the realization that the conceptual apparatus of academic

psychology encourages one to perceive oneself and others as
if humans really were the two-dimensional superficial creat-

ures psychological formulations suggest. To put the matter

again in extreme terms,

I

felt myself a zombie who had

caught a glimpse of himself in a mirror.

Teaching personality to undergraduates only augmented
the growing dissatisfaction

course

I

I

felt.

In my first lecture

did nothing so much as instill in my students a

sequence of new and arcane vocabularies.

I

provided them

with the new conceptual categories, essential for their

written examinations, yet seeming not to enhance their
genuine understanding of human existence. Teaching certainly provides ample

opportunity to observe the socializing

function a discipline requires for currying potential
new members. By insisting to them, as my undergraduate

professors had insisted, that no theoretical statement could
be made unless one could answer the question,

are the data?,"

I

"Oh? Where

observed myself passing on a criterion

for verification that was stultifyingly narrow.

Moreover, the inevitable inveighing against the methods
of introspection, a part of my teaching catechism, breeded

an alienation from the lessons of one's own gut. The lesson
that scientific proof can never obtain from any inner,

19

intuitive corroboration conveyed the message that inner

intuitions themselves are not part of the true scientist's
equipage. As a result, part of the socialization of my

students consisted of breaking the link between one's inner

experience--one's subjective reality--and one's cognitive
formulations. Such a severance,

I

can see now, had been

singularly well accomplished in my own case.
In his

criticism of the field, Hudson (1973) states:

Just as novelists draw on their experiences,
so too do psychologists. We would both be cut
off, otherwise, from the springs of our intellectual vitality. To refuse a psychologist
access to his intuitions, even if this were
possible, would be as stultifying and as
short-sighted as it would be to deny them to
a physicist or a painter.
P.
I

129

sadly must conclude that we are able to make more progress

in reducing access to our intuitions than Hudson believes
is possible.

Perhaps more than anything, it is the typical

confusion between the context of discovery and the context
of justification in science (cf., Rudner, 1966) that promotes
in the bidding student the mistrust of and alienation from

his intuitive experience, for psychologists seek to restrict
the title of science to that portion of the scientific

spectrum

especially appropriate to hypothesis testing.

The message conveyed reads something like this

:

only

when an observation can be externally validated through
appropriate quantitative procedures can one be said to have
made an observation at all; thus, it follows that the good

20

scientist will restrict his perceptions to only such kinds
of observations.

Such a message is akin to another which, though some-

what oversimplified, can be put as follows: only those

qualities of human existence that are quantifiable ought,
for the good scientist, even be visible.
In my second personality course

I

aimed at meeting the

demand's for relevance that students bring to such courses.

The task of translating tack into English the real fruits

of our discipline's researches proved challenging and

difficult.

I

used a theories textbook, but augmented it

with such outside reading as Rogers's Becoming Partners,
Freud's Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria

,

and

Castaneda's Tales of Power. The research journals were of
no use. The best, most enlivening and insightful discussions

grew out of the readings that reached and drew out students*

personal experiences, the readings which did not imply, as
so much of the psychological literature does, that one's

inner life is no more real than doppelgangers or leprechauns.
The combined result of my interviewing studies, my

undergraduate teaching, a good, critical history of

psychology course, and other crises in my personal life

brought me to reassess the field of academic psychology,
as well as my relation to it.

I

drew back from many

intellectual commitments and for the first time in years
was able to attend to the long-mute inner voices.

21

As part of this process of drawing back,

a year a course in freshman rhetoric.

I

taught for

It is possible,

I

was

reminded, to deal intelligibly with ideas that are not

verified solely in terms of their fidelity to empirical
proofs, suggesting that psychology's criterion of knowin
is neither divine nor universal. Rather,

epistemological position which itself

can.

g,-

it represents an

profitably be

put under scrutiny. The content of our concepts reflects

many assumptions and presuppositions about what it means
to kno w,

and

I

believe now that there is a crisis in per-

sonality psychology, one that can be related directly to
these assumptions and presuppositions.

Certain crucial questions have suggested themselves,
perhaps the foremost of which concerns the nature of
science itself. The psychology textbooks

I

have seen have

in no way contradicted the implicit lesson of my own educ-

ation, that there is such a thing as a fixed, universal

scientific process.

Is

this really so? It seems to me now

that the charge of irrelevance cannot be made without

reference to the methodological commitments of psychologists
who place their trust in the scientific method they have

been socialized to take for granted. As noted, many critics
have leveled the charge that personality psychology's troubles

begin with its method-centric ity. Gadlin and Ingle (1975)
put the matter succinctly:
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We ought to begin with a reversal of the
pre-

sent empases: Psychology should initially address
itself to phenomena, not methodology. Rather
than selecting for research those phenomena
suited to our methods, we ought to shape and
develop our methods to fit phenomena.
p.
I

concur.

1007

Psychology suffers from an inadequate understanding

of the scientific process, and the procedures we employ have

untoward consequences both for the import of our research
and for our conceptions of ourselves and others as persons.
The closest formulation of the problem in my view is

embodied in the anti-positivist philosopher of science
Thomas Kuhn's (1970a) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Kuhn's concept of paradigm provides a convenient handle for
the diagnosis of present day personality psychology.
To anticipate the argument of the next chapters,

the

assumptions and presuppositions that constitute personality

psychology's present understanding of science and of method
can be described as a paradigm, and this paradigm is not

something fixed and universal, but, rather, arbitrary and
debatable.

It is my thesis that the

paradigm of contemporary

psychology, shared by personality psychologists, is essent-

ially behaviorist and not especially appropriate for the

study of personality, especially as personality was understood when the field originated. Personality psychology's

history suggests we are in the thrall of a paradigm that
accounts for the crisis we as a field are currently
iencing.

exper-

.
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CHAPTER

II

PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY'S PARADIGM
I

have suggested that personality psychology is a

field in crisis and have included the statements of other

writers who clearly agree. But the field as yet has heard
no general outcry that crisis is at hand. Why is it that
the sense of crisis is not more widespread?
One reason is this: today's personality research for

the most part "works." Many researchers keep at bay any

recognition of crisis through the reassurance they find
in adhering to procedures that are unquestionably and gen-

erally regarded as scientific, and in procuring from these
procedures data that provide significant tests of the

hypotheses they conceptualize.
The problem of personality psychology is not that it

cannot test or verify the questions it raises for itself.
The mechanics of hypothesis-testing and verification as

prescribed work well enough. The problem is not a procedural hitch, not a methodological short-circuit.
The problem in a way is that personality research
is too do-able.

That is, today's research procedures, our

legitimate methods, allow researchers to feel they are
'doing the right thing* with their research, and thus

serve as blinders that imprison the researcher in certain

:

2Ur

conceptualizations of his subject matter
while precluding
others. Moreover, I would maintain,
the conceptualizations
we are in the thrall of lead to the
phrasing of trivial

questions and much irrelevant research.
Personality psychologists, then, have the
satisfaction

both of 'doing what they are supposed to do'
to be scientifically secure and of obtaining results that
are appropriate
to their questions. The crisis, then, is not
brought on
because operating by the book leads to inescapable breakdown.

It does not.

The problem is not within the system. The

system runs. The problem is the system itself.
The problem,

I

would like to say,

is the paradigm

underlying personality research today. The term is taken
from the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn, whose essay
(1970a) advances the thesis that a science develops not by

the gradual accretion of more and more proven facts, but

rather through a succession of world views, or conceptual
pictures, upon which the actual theoretical work of a

given scientific period

— as

well as its taken-for-

granted facts--is based. When a scientific community undergoes a 'revolution,' according to Kuhn, what changes is its

paradigm. This change is like an irreversible gestalt
switch, altering the scientific community's perception of
its subject matter,

its appropriate procedures, and itself.

About paradigm revolution Kuhn states
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...it is a reconstruction of the field from
new fundamentals, a reconstrcution that changes
some of the field's most elementary theoretical
generalizations as well as many of its paradigm
methods and applications. During the transition
period there will be large but never complete
overlap between the problems that can be solved
by the old and the new paradigm. But there will
also be a decisive difference in the modes of
solution. When the transition is complete, the
profession will have changed its views of the
field, its methods, and its goals.
_

P.

Because

I

85

will employ the concept of paradigm in a some-

what crucial role in presenting my argument,
to clarify what

I

I

shall try

mean by it and believe Kuhn, himself,

chiefly means by it.^

-

In his seminal essay Kuhn employs the concept of

paradigm in several different senses, providing critics

with a foothold for levying attacks over the niceties of
definition, while providing his adherents with a richer
sense of his meaning. Masterman, a friendly critic, in
her essay (1970) "The Nature of a Paradigm" counts 21

senses of the term as employed by Kuhn. She remarks that
"not all these senses of 'paradigm* are inconsistent with
one another: some may even be elucidations of others"
(p.

65). 5 Masterman has distilled these different senses

^The application of Kuhn's analysis of science throughout this essay is intended more as an optic to enhance
understanding than as any strict test of Kuhn's ideas.
5Masterman notes that charges of obscurity in Kuhn are
typically levied by philosophers, net scientists themselves.
"perspicuous," a circumActual scientists find Kuhn
stance Masterman attributes to Kuhn's having "really looked
at actual science, in several fields, instead of confining
his field of reading to that of the history and philosophy
of science" (p. 59).

of the term paradigm into three categories: metaphysical,

sociological, and artefactual.
For a fuller account of these definitional distinctions, the interested reader is referred not only to the

Masterman essay, but also to Kuhn's (1970a) postscript to
his original essay, published eight years earlier. In

this discussion, paradigm refers to the system of pre-

suppositions, frequently tacit, that determine how a

scientific community construes (perceives and interprets)
its very subject matter--and, as a consequence, phrases
its problems in the conceptual fashion it ultimately does.

Kuhn gives vivid enough illustrations of the workings
of a paradigm in this sense. He claims that were Aristotle

and Galileo confronted by, say, a stone hanging on a
string, swinging, they would see two different realities:

Aristotle would see "constrained fall;" Galileo, a pendulum. Similarly, according to Kuhn:

Lavoisier ... saw oxygen where Priestley had
seen dephlogisticated air and where others
had seen nothing at all.
p.

18

Paradigms operate at the implicit level to give rise to
the explicit reality we take for granted.
To describe a paradigm, then,

involves making explicit

ideas and preconceptions that are normally taken for
granted. According to an old adage, fish are the last
to discover the existence of water.

Personality psychclo-

gists, similarly, may have a difficult
time discovering
the implicit paradigm presuppositions
that endow our present endeavors with their taken-f
or-granted aura of

scientific respectability and inevitability.
Since the quickest and most reliable aid to
the fish's

discovery of water is its removal from it, it follows
that
the presuppositions one makes as a personality
psychologist

might to a certain extent be made clear by transposing
oneself into a different field. Something of the sort

occurred to me when

I

became a teacher of rhetoric, a trans-

position out of empirical science altogether.
I

was struck first by the willingness of other acad-

emicians seriously to entertain ideas without demanding

quantitative proofs of any kind. An idea, it would seem,
could have cogency independent of anyone's marshalling

numerical evidence to support it. An idea, to put it bluntly,
was not necessarily illegitimate just because it was never

wedded to an operation.
Take, for example,

Orwell's essay "Politics and The

English Language." Orwell advances the thesis that corruption of language leads to corruption of both thought and

governance, a reasonable idea, certainly, in light of,
say, the Watergate locutions.

Orwell argues his position

well, but there is nothing in the process of argument that

approaches what

I,

as a psychologist, am accustomed to

consider as proof. He gives examples cf misleading,

.

^
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treacherous, and ugly usages, but a psychologist would

build his case very differently.
A psychologist would automatically begin to ponder
the

measurement of dependent and independent variables.
He might
devise a goodness-of-English-usage test, to be administered
as a measure of corruption of language.

Possibly the subjects

would be divided according to how willing they are to use
"ain't." A test of high school civics might be adopted as
an index of commitment to decent government. The first step
in the procedure,

it should be noted,

is to anchor one's

concepts in reality, which in the world—or paradigm

— of

psychology is the effect of codification and quantification.

Operationalizing one's concepts, for the psychologist,
realizes them.
The completion of the study whose beginnings

I

have

sketched above can be left to the enterprising imagination;
the point

I

want to make is in reference to certain rules

of the game that became clear when

I

had achieved some

perspective on personality psychology. These rules, it seemed
to me, had a great deal to do with verificatio n, which is to

say method

.

Striking differences are immediately apparent in the

methods of an English essayist and American psychologists,

Rudner (1966) distinguishes the term method from
technique and procedure, defining method as a discipline's
logic of justification: the rationale by which a discipline
bases its acceptance or rejection of hypotheses or theories.
(See p.

5

)
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but paradigm differences occur among the
sciences and, as
hope to show, among the disciplines of psychology.

I

The student of personality theories has an
advantage
in understanding Kuhn's concept of paradigm,
is anticipated in George Kelly's

for the usage

(1955) personal construct

theory and its philosophical foundation, constructive
alternativism. Kelly explained personality itself as the
process of sensibly construing the world, and he assumed
the world is open to potentially infinite numbers of

different interpretations, many of which being completely
capable of yielding a fair share of accurate empirical
predictions. 3y extending the individual notion of construct system onto a scientific community, we arrive at Kuhn's

conception of paradigm (indeed, Kelly liked to draw the
analogy in reverse: his snapshot description of human
nature is "Man the scientist.").
When an individual's construct system is transformed,
his reality changes. We can understand Kuhn's description
of scientific revolution as a catyclysmic shift in the

underlying construct system not of an individual alone,
but of a community of scientists, of an entire discipline.
"After a revolution," writes Kuhn

(p.

Ill),

"scientists

are responding to a different world."
The idea of scientists responding to a different world

has been illustrated by Kuhn with examples from physics and
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chemistry: Aristotle and Galileo,
Lavoisier and Priestley.
But we can add one, at least hypothetioally
from psychology.
Let us imagine in the presence of two of
psychology's most
famous mythological beasts— the radical behaviorist
and
,

the tender-minded humanist— an infant who, in
lay terms,
is crying its eyes cut.

Would our two psychologists, rep-

resenting such diverse perspectives?, see the same thing?
The behaviorist,

one can reasonably assume, might

report "a human organism emitting an operant in obeyance
with its reinforcement history," while the humanist might
describe "a human being in its formative years reacting

with displeasure and pain to some unfulfilled need."
That they are seeing two different realities might be

made clear by their answers to such questions as,

"What,

if anything is wrong here?," and "What might a solution be?"
The behaviorist might conclude that the operant

emitted is undesirable and should no longer be reinforced.
His solution might be not to attend the organism (e.g.,

provide positive reinforcement) while it continued to cry.
The humanist might define the problem in terms of the threat
to the baby's sense of trust in the world and confidence
in its own efficacy.

The humanist,

interpreting the crying

^The term "perspective" is employed here rather than
"paradigm" to avoid confusion with the application of the
latter concept to psychology throughout this thesis. It is
certainly arguable that paradigm differences divide
behavior ists and humanists, however.

.

as a meaningful communication, might recommend
fulfilling

the unmet need. Doing so would engender a sense
of both

trust and agency, the ideal 'solution.'
The same reality? Clearly not. The humanist, one can

assume, would regard the behaviorist

'

s

recommendation as

a formula for crippling the child psychologically, while

the humanist's solution would seem a matter of coddling
to invisible demons to the behaviorist. Worse,

it would

unintentionally reinforce the very problem one hoped to
extinguish
Both of these hypothetical psychologists are responding
to different conceptual formulations and, more,

realities.
is

Is

to different

one right and the other wrong? The question-

certainly complicated. Each perspective

ment holds generally for paradigms

— tends

— and

the argu-

to justify itself

and be justified in its own terms, while failing completely
in the terms of another.

The behaviorist might,

should he be granted the oppor-

tunity for a test, succeed completely in extinguishing the

undesired operant. The removal of the crying and wailing
behavior

— at

once obvious to any and all--is empirically

sufficient in the behaviorist view to lend support to the
entire behaviorist system.

In his terms he is clearly

•right.'

And the humanist, too, given the opportunity, might
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succeed, completely in raising from that
infant an adult

with a sense of both trust and agency. The
conscious and
perhaps subconscious indications of trust and agency,
obvious to the perceptive, insightful observer—but
perhaps

invisible to the perceptive, insightful behaviorist—
are

sufficient to support the humanist system. In his terms he,
too,

clearly 'right.' What is really going on depends

is

in the end upon the perspective

reality

— from

— hence,

the paradigm or

which one views the situation. Even basic

'facts' are paradigm dependent.

How might the paradigm of personality psychology today
be sketched? My experience as a rhetoric teacher suggested

that we take for granted that what is real is what is

measurable.

If we can measure something,

it exists;

if

something cannot.be measured, its existence is much lsss
certain.

It is paradigmatic that what is conf irmably

observable is scientifically real. Here we might detect
the influence of Watson's early behaviorism: no invisible

mental demons for the science of psychology, and that
includes personality psychology.
The mention of John E, Watson in the context of

personality psychology might strike an anachronistic note
for personality psychologists, but

that it is not.

Indeed,

I

I

shall argue the case

shall argue that the paradigm of

contemporary academic personality psychology is essentially

.
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behavior ist, and that it originated in the Watsonian

behaviorism of the early 1900* s, although it did not
become the paradigm of personality psychology for another
30 or so years.

Am

I

going too far in asserting that personality

psychology's paradigm is essentially behavior ist?
think not, even though

I

I

am aware of how greatly our

explicit explanatory formulations differ from those of
today's behaviorists
To approach the behavior ist heart of personality

psychology's current paradigm, let us consider oar methodological stance. What, for the personality psychologist,

constitutes verification or proof? A first approximation
to an answer is this: empirical demonstration. Empirical

demonstration, we are proud to note, delineates science

from whatever it
included here

is

the novelist

— and

Orwell would be

— does.

But to say "empirical demonstration" is not enough,

for on close inspection the concept of a single, unitary

process that we can identify as empirical demonstration

proves untenable. Empirical demonstration can refer to
different, perhaps even conflicting, processes in

different paradigms. The introspectionists

,

as Horace

Eidwell English (1921) of We lies ley College makes clear
in his

"In Aid of Introspection," considered themselves

:
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as empirically scientific as the smuggest
behaviorist of

today
Introspection is neither an esoteric art
which can be practiced only by the initiated,
nor an instinct placed by Nature in the breasts
of all in order that the study of psychology
might be possible. It is a scientific method.
m

p.

^-0^

The introspectionists regarded their technique as nothing

less than the direct observation of their subject matter,

and so it was in the light of their paradigm. In the
light of the behavior is t paradigm, though, they may have
made no scientifically acceptable observations at all.

Empirical demonstration for today's psychologist, and
this includes the personality psychologist, essentially

means the prediction and control of behavior.

In terms of

what psychological researchers do, much can be understood
if one grasps the verificatory role accorded to the predict

ion and control of behavior. Because behavior is accorded

such a central role in the field's method, calling the para

digm behaviorist seems reasonable.
As

I

hope to show in later chapters, personality

psychology did not originally subscribe to the behaviorist
paradigm. The adoption of the behaviorist paradigm has

inverted the discipline's relationship

to

behavior. Be-

fore the adoption of the behaviorist paradigm, personality

psychologists had as their explanatory goal the scientific
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account of human nature and of individuality, and behavior was methodologically important only

to

the extent it

provided insights into what needed explanation (the
structure and organization of personality). Today we
have a different relationship to behavior. Like other

psychologists, we are led by our methodological assumptions
into the quest of predicting it. What differentiates us

from other psychologists is our willingness to entertain
the idea of, and employ, personali ty variables to better

predict and control.

Instead of being useful if and when

it provided insight into personality, behavior has

become an explanatory goal in itself. Now personality

variables are useful if and when they enable the prediction
and control of behavior.

Today's psychologists take for granted the epistemo-

logical sanctity of predicting and controlling behavior,
and to get them even to entertain questioning the process
for its cargo of presuppositions is hard.

In the case of

personality psychology, a question rarely asked--or
actually posable in terms of the paradigm--is this: What
does behavior have to do with personality? Given that the

reality of personality variables

is

intimately bound up with

their usefulness in predicting and controlling behavior—
or,

at least, with their capacity for being even indirectly

measured in terms of some observable behavior--the question

.
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seems crucial. Standing apart from today's paradigm, one

could reasonably suggest on a priori

grounds that behav-

ior is at best only tangentially related to personality.

Personality is both inner and mental, while behavior is

external and social, evidently subject to many influences
other than personality. Not every act—nor for that matter

most acts

— are

especially expressive of personality.

But in terms of today's paradigm a pareilel between

personality and behavior is taken for granted, and the
subject matter of personality in a very real sense is

forced to be that-which-allows-the-prediction-and-controlof-behavior. Thus, the dis juncture between behavior and

personality creates vexing problems for today's personality
psychologists
Their predicament is illustrated by the controversy

that grew out of Mischel's (1968) Personality and Asse ssment

,

which suggested strongly

of quantified examples

— that

— and

in the

"best tradition"

personality variables were

for the most part incapable even of reliability, the simplest

form of prediction. The Mischel controversy involved a
threat to the field, for the alledged inability of person-

ality variables to predict behavior in the face of the
ability to predict on the basis of situation was interpreted as an attack on the reality of personality variables.

Personality psychologists were placed in the defensive

.
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role of trying to establish that personality
variables
do exist--that is, can predict successfully.

Prom outside the perspective of the paradigm
assumptions about behavior,

the entire 'Mischel controversy'

suggests an entirely different meaning. If, as the evidence
seems to suggest, the regularities of behavior so often

emanate from external, situational influences, then it

follows that the prediction and control of behavior is
not especially useful as a criterion for establishing
the legitimacy of personality variables. Putting the point
in slightly different terms,

to predict behavior is not to

explain personality. The entire 'Mischel controversy'
depends on our paradigm assumptions regarding behavior.
In

addition to the epistemological role accorded to

the prediction of behavior, today's paradigm is heavily

quantitative. Our quantitative assumptions can be made

explicit by encountering a treatment of personality that
fails to exemplify them. Consider this statement from

Sheehy's (1977) Passages

:

It's plausible, though it can't be proven,
that the mastery of one set of tasks fortifies us for the next period and the next set of
challenges. But it's important not to think too
mechanistically. Machines work by units. The
bureaucracy (supposedly) works step by step.
Human beings, thank God, have an individual
inner dynamic that can never be precisely

coded
PP. 36-37

Practicing research psychologists may not necessarily
disagree in principle with the statement that individuals

,
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can never be precisely coded, but their research
certainly

presupposes the codif lability of personality processes.

What marks Sheehy's sentiments as especially
non-paradigmatic is her obvious approval of the state of affairs
in which simple mechanistic formulations will not
do

("thank God "4

)

Today's paradigm assumes a world in which all the

important data are quantifiable, and in which the elements

will behave in some lawlike, determined, and knowable
fashion. The assumption regarding codability is typically

corrupted, though, from the position that all the important

data can be quantified to the view that only the data that
can be quantified are important

— and

even real.

This emphasis upon codification and quantification

probably derives from the early behaviorists
of science,

'

understanding

stressing as it did the idea that theoretical

statements are scientific only when securely anchored in

what is observable. Stated somewhat more clearly, psychologists take the measurable for the existent.

Observable evidence

— "hard

data"

— is

important in our

paradigm. The superficial history imparted by introductory

textbooks suggests that by the 1920'

s

American psychology

threw overboard its dreamy mentalism and, taking its cues

from physics, demanded more rigor by becoming empirical.
But it is an open question whether the empirical procedures
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favored by the behaviorist paradigm actually constitute
a
scientific method deserving of the additional adjectives
one and only

.

What exactly is the relationship among the

measurable, the real, and the methods we call scientific?
A number of writers within the social sciences have

commented on this point, or close to it. Apparently

assuming the view that the present procedures of the
social sciences constitute the scientific method, sociologist Berger (1963) concludes that not all of reality is

scientifically treatable:
Nothing is farther from the intentions of
this writer to come out now with a statement
of allegiance to that positivistic creed, still
fashionable among some American social scientists
that believes in only those fragments of reality
that can be dealt with scientifically. Such
positivism results almost invariably in one form
or another of intellectual barbarism, as has
been demonstrated admirably in the recent
history of behavioristic psychology in this
country.
P.
I

12/*-

agree with Berger that by taking as real only that

formulation of reality 'visible* to our current methods
we necessarily become intellectually barbarian, or at least

barren; but

I

disagree with the implication that one

must go beyond science itself to evolve beyond the intellectual stone ages. According to Berger,

"only an intellect

ual barbarian is likely to maintain that reality is only

that which

car.

be grasped by scientific methods" (p.

1^1).

.

Perhaps the problem is not the
narrowness of science, but
rather the narrow interpretation of it
to which we now
subscribe

Deese (1972) contends that our present
blinders are
the result of having adopted as our
conception of science
the model of late nineteenth century
physics:
Less valuable has been the blind transfer
of the conceptual apparatus of the physical
sciences to psychology as a whole. This wholesale transfer is evident in innumerable ways-in certain kinds of psychological theories
(which are usually stated in analytic mathematical form), in reliance upon statistical
inference, in the preeminence of the notion
of experiment, and in the common use of terms
like "independent and dependent variable" to
describe the form of scientific exploration
in psychology. Of course the commitment goes
deeper than these superficial characteristics.
A very significant proportion of those
psychologists who are leaders in scientific
research follow, in some instances almost
blindly, a theory of scientific method that
represents a philosophic formalization of the
methods of late nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury physics. Many of these psychologists
believe that the development of the main
outlines of scientific method stopped in the
second quarter of the twentieth century.
_

?.
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The old-fashioned philosophical formulations Deese refers

to include both operationalism and positivism.

(Positivism,

it should be notes, runs through today's paradigm like

water in quicksand, promoting the acceptance of today's
methods and conceptions because of their firm basis in

empirical support, mindless of the ease with which other
methods and other conceptualizations could, even where

totally contradictory, similarly generate empirical

)

support.

Evident in Deese's statement is the assertion that
other conceptions of scientific method are possible. Not

only are they possible, they have already existed. Kuhn
has suggested that we be suspicious of a given paradigm's

version of its science's history, for, like nations and
individuals, scientific disciplines selectively revise

their accounts of the past to better legitimate the form-

ulations of the present. The introspectionists

,

today

widely 'remembered' as scientifically naive, as previously
noted, were in their own eyes as indisputably scientific
as today's researcher with his pocket calculator and

computer printout. According to Rychlak (1968)1
The great advocate of American introspection,
Titchener, proposed that we accept his tool
as a methodological standard, a vehicle for
evidence which he took to be validational. For
him, science was an act of trained observation,
followed by analysis of data. The more direct
the observation, the better the science. Measurement and experimentation were viewed as
"roundabout" ways of practicing observation....
The most direct means of gaining scientific
knowledge was through the exercise of trained,
disinterested, self-observation and analysis.
P.

203

Does every paradigm pass its own version of science
as the true scientific method, then? It would seem so, and

from noting it we might obtain a liberating sense of

flexibility and relativity in science.
But at the moment we are the seeming prisoners of

our own paradigm which, as Deese has suggested, emulates
the model of Victorian physics.

Is

it any wonder,

then,

if we convert our subject matter into physics-like dimen-

sions? The operant, to take an example from psychology
at large,

is a particle of behavior, whose lawlike prop-

erties are sufficiently abstract as to exist conceptually

independently of time and place or even of the organism
whose operant it is. It is, in short, the atom of behavior.

Certain procedures employed in personality research
show the influence of physicalistic science. A good example
is the

idea of a one-step assay, the

idea,

deeply embedded

in our research practices that important information

about human existence can be obtained by a simple, speedy,
one-time measurement. The model here is temperature-taking,
or assaying the purity of an ore. We believe we can take

our subjects' temperatures for need for achievement or for

ego development , obtain a permanent score, and be done in
5

or 20 minutes.

Small wonder that so much research in

personality involves less than an hour's direct contact
of researcher and subject

— and

often enough that hour is

sufficient time for the researcher to assay all his
subjects, 50 to 500, in mass testing. Research projects

involving no face-to-face contact between subject and
experimenter are not uncommon.
Let us step back from the argument and consider what

has been said. Methodological commitments have consequence.s
for the kinds of questions raised--and not raised--by a

science.

If,

in psychology,

the criterion for reality

becomes equated with the prediction and control of behavior,
the nature of the problems individual psychologists work on

will reflect that criterion. While the chief riddle cf

personality had once been the structure and organization
of individuality—the kind of problem that might be solved

by one or another general theory of personality, today's
riddle involves the discovery of that which will enable
the prediction and control of behavior.

Instead of a general

theory of personality, an adequate solution might take
the form of a regression equation involving discrete,

easily operationalized and quantified personality variablessuch as the equations and variables developed by Rotter
and Cattell.
We can summarize the effects of today's paradigm by

suggesting a kind of parlor game, one that. can be played at
a cocktail party.

The goal is to learn what one can about

human existence, and the other persons present are all
available as sources of information. 3ut there are limits

upon the collection cf information. The only questions
allowable are those that can be answered quantitatively.
Additionally, the truth of any statement is contingent

upon its being externally and publicly obvious. Finally,
no more than 10 minutes of direct face-to-face exposure
to any one person are allowed.

How likely is it that important information can be

obtained when we are limited to questions that are quant-

itatively phrased, and by research designs involving

minimal exposure to subjects? How likely are we to delve
into the depths of personality when we adopt as a method
an outlook quite blind to the non-quantifiable aspects of

human existence? Clearly, the methodological commitments
of today's paradigm have conceptual ramifications. As

Hudson (1973) states:
This wholesale concern with what people actually
do with their lives--as scientists, politicians,
salesmen, husbands, parents, students—rather
than simply with their answers to psychological
tests, is something that has been lost almost
entirely from psychology. Evidence about people's
lives is new treated as though it were vaguely
unseemly.
P.

In place of

"unseemly,"

I

16?

would substitute "invisible."
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CHAPTER

III

THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE PARADIGMS? AN HISTORICAL INQUIRY

Adopting the prediction and control of behavior as its

chief validational method, today's behavior ist personality

paradigm represents a host of physicalistic

,

quantitative,

and externalistic methodological presuppositions, forming,
in sum, a tacit but compelling background reality shaping

psychological conceptualizing and research. This paradigm
encourages an impoverished conceptualization of personhood,

blinding us to both the depth and the organization of
inner experience. We have reduced the person into a col-

lection of variables organized to suit the specifications
of regression equations rather than any 'natural contours'
of human beings.
I

am suggesting, then, that our paradigm is inappro-

priate to our subject matter, a depressing circumstance if
true. But to speak in Kuhnian terms, as

I

do here, would

seem to require adopting a relativistic view that would
make claims about a paradigm's being well or poorly suited
to a discipline wholly arbitrary and subjective. Are there

grounds for considering one paradigm more or less suited
to a discipline's subject matter than, or better or worse
than, another?
The question is tricky.

The temptation is great to use

the criteria of one paradigm to judge another. We are
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commonly told, for example, that the theories of
personality
failed as examples of scientific formulations because
they

are inadequate to the task of predicting behavior. This

criticism assumes a universality to contemporary criteria
which, at least historically, they do not have. This criticism is blind to the possibility that such theories succeed
as scientific formulations in terms of the criteria of the

paradigm out of which they grew, a paradigm

I

shall call

the personalistic personality paradigm and which

I

shall

elaborate upon below.
The concept of paradigm essentially suggests that we

never perceive reality in neutral or non-paradigm dependent terms, but even so,

I

believe paradigms can be evaluated
o

in terms that are neither necessarily biased nor unfair.
In this essay

I

shall discuss the adequacy of personal-

ity psychology's paradigms through an historical perspective.

The argument can be made, for example, that a paradigm
"works" to the extent that it provides sufficient numbers
of solvable puzzles for its constituents. Kuhn (1970b) has
gone so far as to suggest that providing solvable puzzles
is the criterion for determining that a field is a science.
The vast amount of research dene in personality today is
ample evidence that today's paradigm supplies solvable
puzzles. But the availability of puzzles cannot simply be
equated with their intrinsic goodness and to argue that
today's behavior ist paradigm "works" in this sense is
certainly not to demonstrate that it is, for personality,
the best of all possible paradigms.
,

_
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Today's paradigm,

I

argue, has usurped the place cf an

earlier paradigm, or, at least, has prevented the full

flowering and articulation of an earlier paradigm, now
lost.

I

will argue that this earlier paradigm, snuffed

out by today's behavioristic one, was better adapted to

the subject matter of personality and more promising than
the paradigm now in ascendance.

What

I

am suggesting, however, seems to contradict

the thrust of Kuhn's vision of scientific development.

While Kuhn has been explicit in denying any teleological

development toward truth, he envisions the sequence of

normal science, from anomaly and crisis, to paradigm
revolution, to normal science again, and so on, as

essentially an evolutionary process. Kuhn (1970a) makes
clear the Darwinian parallel:
The net result of a sequence of such revolutionary selections, separated by periods of
normal research, is the wonderfully adapted
set of instruments we call modern scientific
knowledge. Successive stages in that developmental process are marked by an increase in
articulation and specialization. And the entire
process may have occurred, as we now suppose
biological evolution did, without benefit of
a set goal, a permanent fixed scientific truth,
of which each stage in the development of
scientific knowledge is a better exemplar.
pp.

172-173

Kuhn's position, then, would seem to be that whatever the

problems of today's paradigm, it ought to be better— in
the sense of better adapted—than the paradigm which
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preceeded it.
Can the view that today's paradigm is better adapted
to the subject matter of personality be supported? What

seems called for is an historical comparison of paradigm

change in personality psychology with Kuhn's model of

scientific revolution. Does the history of personality

psychology sufficiently parallel Kuhn's model of scientific

development to justify the conclusion that today's
paradigm is the fittest?
A consideration of personality psychology's history
is a surprisingly difficult task,

for

I

found no explicit-

history of the field as an academic disciple. This lack
has been noted by other writers (Hudson, 1975; Rychlak,
1968). Textbooks are of little help, implying, typically,
a chronological development of theories from Freud's to,

say,

Cattell's, suggesting that with Freud's first

publications the field of personality get under way.
Accounts of philosophical conceptualizations of
personhood, such as Burnham's (1968) "Historical Back-

ground for the Study of Personality," suggest we view present models of personhood as the flourishing in modern

hues of ideas that have their origins in germinal philo-

sophical roots, ignoring, it would seem, the issue of how

institutionalization into an academic discipline

car.

mark

the beginning of a new kind of enterprise for studying

personality. Kuhn notes (1970a) in his postscript that the

k9

concept of paradigm is tied in with the existence of a

community of scholars. A discipline is an interlocking
community, united by a common set of journals, research
literature, academic courses, and the like. What is

missing is an historical account of the community of
scholars who considered themselves personality psychologists.
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn

suggests that any science quite normally distorts its

field's history in order better tc socialize new members
into the belief that the present formulations represent

only the fruits of the past, and that these contemporary

formulations, moreover, are logically mandated by everythin
that had come before. So it should not be surprising
to discover what amounts to a coverup of history in

psychology. Our textbooks, as Kuhn suggests they should,
indulge in distortions that at times seem shameless.
Consider, for example, the impressions Muss en, Rozenzweig,
et

.

al.

(1973) give to introductory psychology students of

how psychology has developed:
The continual growth of psychology as a
scientific discipline makes it hard to define.
Originally, about a century ago, psychology was
defined as "the study of the mind "--the normal,
adult, European, human mind. Each of these
limiting adjectives was eventually discarded-psychologists began to investigate abnormal as
well as normal individuals, children as well as
adults, people in other cultures as well as
Europeans, and animals as well as human beings.

.
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Even the noun was changed from "mind" to
"behavior." The study of the individual v/as
supplemented by studies of groups and
societies
P.

5

The implication that the shift in focus from mind to

behavior is merely another instance of removing cumbersome,

limiting adjectives standing in the way of "con-

tinual growth" to me is shocking, but such shock presupposes sufficient distance from today's paradigm to

recognize the difference between a science of mind and
a science of behavior.

For the crop of students socialized

to the behavior ist paradigm, the belief implied above,

that in psychology every day in every way things are get-

ting better and better, is a glib truism requiring not even
a second thought.

Without a clear sense of the origin and history of the
discipline, personality psychologists stand in danger of

swallowing entire the saccharined bromide that the field,
like any science, progresses through an accumulation of

increasingly refined and time-tested truths, discarding

along the way formulations that prove less tenable than
their more modern competitors and replacements.
The nebulous sense of history a personality psycholo-

gist might pick up would sound something like this
late 1800'

s

:

In the

Freud and his followers, physicians, began

treating psychologically disturbed persons, and

in the
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process developed some creative, albeit
largely unscientific, theories of personality.
Since then other thinkers,
typically psychologists engaged in clinical
practice,
but not always, have developed competing
theories. However
interesting, these theories suffered when
psychologists
in personality became increasingly
rigorous in their

scientific standards. When it actually came to
testing
these theories in a scientifically proper fashion,
they
did not hold up at all. The trend in recent
years has been
to develop more rigorous,

smaller, testable conceptions:

more hypotheses than vague general theories.
Part of the beauty of this fuzzy history lies in its

justification and legitimation of current practice. The old
toots of the past meant well, you see, but they had not

quite got the knack of science, which is hardly surprising

when you consider the antique modes of conveyance they

probably used (Hanson cabs and the like) as well as the
quill pens with which they probably indited their armchair begotten thoughts.
But that dream of history is false.

Personality psych-

ology as an academic discipline in America did not begin

with Freud. A reasonable starting place is 1924 at Harvard
where Gordon Allport taught what is believed to be the
first personality course in American higher education.
Let us examine what we can about the history of American
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personality psychology; the survey that follows sheds
light on the transition of paradigms in our field.
;/e

begin with Allport, for a good case can be made that

he brought the field to America and, with his 193? text-

book,

for many years defined it.

Allpo rt

.

We are fortunate that Allport

(1968) has

provided in his essay "An Autobiography" an account of the

personal influences that spurred the development of personality psychology. As an undergraduate at Harvard
Allport was exposed to the psychology of his day. He took
Hugo '.'lunsterberg'

s

course, reading in the process that

professor's 191^ text, Psychology; General and Ap plied
About the course Allport notes,

"I

.

learned little except

that 'causal' psychology was not the same thing as

•purposive' psychology"

(p.

380).^ Allport's training,

not surprisingly, was highly steeped in the tradition of

Germanic influence in American psychology, that link from
Wundt to Titchener. Allport, who won the Sheldon travel

y

That Munster berg's class left some deep impression
on Allport is indicated by his remarks in his 25th Reunion
Report: "Professionally, I have been trying to solve a few
of the riddles of human nature. Sometimes, while holding
forth from the platform in Emerson D, I ask myself whether
we have made much progress since Professor I'dinsterberg
expanded on 'Ze causal and purposive nature of ze mind'
to our class at the sleepy two o'clock hour from the same
rostrum back in 1916." (25th Reunion Repor t, Harvard Glass
of 1919, 19W.
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fellowship in 1922, spoke of his decision to study in

Germany as follows

:

The German tradition in psychology was still
strong in America, although Germany itself had
been flattened by World War I and inflation. It
was only natural for me to head for Germany.
William James and E. E. Titchener had immortalized
in^ their textbooks the Teutonic foundations of our
science, and my own teachers had studied there.
p.

386

But what he found as a striking influence in Germany was

not a continuation of the strand of Germanic psychology
to which he had been previously exposed:

was not prepared, however, for the powerful impact of my German teachers who included
the aged Stumpf and Dessoir, the younger -lax
Wertheimer, Wolfgang Kohler, and Eduard Spranger
in Berlin, and in Hamburg, William Stern and
Heinz Werner. A fellow student was He inrich
Kluver, who helped me with my halting German,
and who has remained a cherished friend ever
since even though our paths of psychological
interest have diverged.
At that time Gestalt was a new concept.
I had not heard of it before leaving Cambridge.
It took me some weeks to discover why my
teachers usually started their two-hour lectures
with a castigation of David Hume. 3oon I learned
he was a natural whipping boy for the German
structural schools of thought. Ganzheit and
Gestalt Struktu r and Leftenf or men and die
unteilb'are Perso'n were new music to my ears.
Here was the kind of psychology^ I had been
longing for but did not know existed.
pp. 396-387
I

,

The experience in Germany enabled Allport to develop a

psychology that was simply not a continuation of the
American psychology of the time. There was, with the
founding of personality psychology, a new root, independent
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of both the Titchener ian-Wundtian tradition and of
the new

Watsonian behavior is ts

.

When Allport returned to the

United States he pioneered this new kind of psychology.
That his thinking had departed from the kind of psychology
done in the American 2ast is illustrated by an incident

concerning Allport'

s

doctoral dissertation and the great

Titchener himself.
Allport*

s

dissertation,

"An Experimental Study of the

Traits of Personality: With Special Reference to the Problem of Social Diagnosis," was, according to Allport,

"per-

haps the first American dissertation written explicitly
on the question of the component traits of personality"
(P.

385). As his work neared completion, he was invited

with other graduate students

bo

Clark University, to

attend the select gathering of Titchener ian experimentalists

:

After two days of discussing problems in
sensory psychology Titchener allotted three
minutes to each visiting graduate to describe
his own investigations. I reported on the traits
of personality and was punished by the rebuke
of total silence from the group, punctuated by
a glare of disapproval from Titchener. Later
Titchener demanded of Langfeld, "Why did you
let him work on that problem?" Back in Cambridge
Langfeld again consoled me with the laconic
remark, "You don't care what Titchener thinks."
And I found that I did not.
P.

335

In his own terms Allport saw himself "standing at a

frontier"
"maverick"

(p.

(p.

385), as pursuing "deviant" (p.

335) and

386) interests. Looking back from the van-
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tage point of the late 1960's, Allport could
say,
of course,

"Later,

the field of personality became not only accept-

able but highly fashionable."
The case

I

am arguing is that personality psychology's

origins were independent of the major traditions warring
for control of psychology in the arena of American academic

psychology in the 1920'

s.

Although the mistaken notion

of history suggests gradual and measured progression and

change, the actual history of American psychology is in
some ways reminiscent of the warring Goths after the fall
of Rome.

The big positions were held by the Titchenerian-

'.Vundtian

introspectionists and by the new-fangled, Amer-

ican behavior ists

.

In the midst of this war,

personality

psychology had its independent origin. Its paradigm, too,
would be independent.
It should be clear from Titchener's glare of dis-

approval that Allport'

s

personality psychology differed

sufficiently from the Titchenerian view of what psychology
ought to be.

It is

equally true that Allport'

s

vision

of psychology conflicted with that of the behaviorists

who eventually eclipsed the introspectionists and whose

paradigm established itself as a monopoly in American
psychology. While Allport 's interest in the pattern of

organization of such "inner" variables as personality
traits and the self

conflicts on the most obvious levels
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of conceptual content with behaviorism, underlying
dif-

ferences in the nature of method in psychology also
existed, and these differences are noteworthy.
The differences can be expressed in terms of an

understanding of science. 3y the time his I96I text was
published, when American psychology was deeply wedded to
its behaviorist paradigm, Allport*

s

protesting views stood

in sharp relief. He believed that methods should derive

from subject matter, not vice-versa:
Since positivism seeks nomothetic generalizations about behavior it is likely to regard
curiosity about the internal order of mind-inparticular as subjective and "unscientific." It
somehow seems more scientific to send a platoon
of white rats through a maze than to occupy
oneself with the complex organization of a
concrete personality. It is more respectable
to pursue averages and probabilities for populations than to study the life-style of one
person. Such preference is net hard to explain
in a culture that is technological and machinecentered.
The only real difficulty with the positivist
formulation is that it does not know (or rarely
knows) that it is a prisoner of a specific
philosophical outlook, also of a specific period
of culture, and of a narrow definition of
"science." Positivism seldom defends its deterministic, quasi-mechanical view of the human
person; it merely takes it for granted.
.

.

.

P.

551

Clearly Allport defines himself apart from the dominent paradigm of the day. Examples of Allport*

s

jousting

with the methodological prescriptions of the positivist,
behaviorist paradigm are common, for Allport was famous
for his stand championing the validity of research into

"

individuality, claiming that we cannot
study "personality
in general" because individuals do
not exist in general,
only in particular.
The understanding of science inherent
in the behavior
ist paradigm stresses the universality
of elements: all

oxygen embodies the same properties, universal
laws

relate the rate of fall to the mass of objects,
and so
on.

The operant, to translate this expectation into
the

current paradigm, regardless of the organism, follows

universal laws (e.g., the law of effect). Allport, in
his 1937 text, argues against this conception of science:
The person who is a unique and never-repeated
phenomenon evades the traditional scientific
approach at every step. In fact, the more
science advances, the less do its discoveries
resemble the individual life with its patent
continuities, mobility, and reciprocal pene*
tration of functions.
Starting with an infinitely more complex
subject-matter than the other biological
sciences, but with the same presuppositions,
the psychologist has isolated his fragmentary
elements, has generalized and verified his
findings in the manner of the austere elder
sciences. He has succeeded in discovering
orderly processes in the "generalized mind,
but the phenomenon of individuality, so
deliberately excluded, returns to haunt him.
V/hether he delimits his science as the study of
the mind, the soul, of behavior, purpose,
consciousness, or human nature, --the persistent, indestructible fact of organization in
terms of individuality is always present. To
abstract a generalized human mind from a population of active, prepossessing, well-knit persons is a feat of questionable value. The
eneralized human mind is entirely mythical;
•

58
it lacks the most essential characteristics

—

of mind,
locus, organic quality, reciprocal
action of parts, and self-consciousness.
This exclusion of the individual from pu-^
psychology has led to many anomalies. It has,
for example, often been pointed out that the
psychologist, in spite of his profession, is
not a superior judge of people. He should be,
>

but his ascetic and meager formulae derived
from "generalized mind" do not go far in
accounting for the peculiar richness and
uniqueness of minds that are organic and single.
P.

5

The dominent conception of science in psychology,

Allport felt, results in an inadequate understanding of
personhood.

was his desire that the field of person-

It

ality sidestep these methodological quagmires. Put simply,
he intended for personality psychology something new.

Procedures must derive not from a borrowed, prior con-

ception of science, but rather from the nature of the
subject matter under study. Allport (19^2) wrote,

"What-

ever contributes to a knowledge of human nature is an

admissible method to science"

(p.

35).

Allport favored the study of the individual as such,
and in his compilation of research methods for personality

psychologists

(

cf.

,

Allport

,

1961,

chapters 17 and 18) he

included case-study interviewing, personal record research,
and other procedures open to information not essentially
of the codifiable and quantitative variety.

Under his

editorship the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
which became the very Journal of Personality and Social

t

Psychol ogy discussed in the first chapter,
commonly

.

published case studies, a format unthinkable
in today's
journal. Allport accepted the reality of the

inner exper-

ience of selfhood, so his methodological
prescriptions

could not be blind to subjects' subjectivity. He
believed
that the most revealing single question one could
put to
a subject was this: What future are you trying
to bring

about for yourself?
In this brief account of Allport 's influence

have

I

stressed his methodological independence more than

I

have

the originality of his personalistic conceptualizations,

partly because the latter are more widely known. Even
so,

from the passages

I

have quoted a sense of that per-

sonalistic focus can surely be gleaned, and no doubt can
exist that the personality psychology Allport envisioned

differs from that practiced today.
But in order to speak of an independent, personalis

paradigm predating today's behaviorist personality paradigm,

it must be shown that other psychologists shared

Allport

's

independence from the behaviorist paradigm

otherwise spreading through American psychology.
Murray. Writing in his Explorations of Personality

Henry

A.

Murray (1938), another pioneer of personality

psychology, makes plain his willingness to explore per-

sonality according to lights both new and maverick:

,
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Our emphasis was upon emotional
and behavioural

reactions what previous experiences
determined them, to what degree and
in what
manner. This preoccupation let
our studies
somewhat aside the university
tradition' For
it has been the custom in
academic psychology
to concentrate upon the
perceptive and cognitive
hUman
mind ° r more recently,
*?•
upon t22V£
the behaviour of animals.
,

'

pp.

vii-viii

That the work of Murray, conducted as
the first self-

styled personologist, lay "somewhat outside
the university tradition" is captured by the recollections
of

graduate study recorded by Hevitt Sanford
(1976), one
of Murray's former graduate students,
now president of
the Wright Institute:

In^the 1930s, the Harvard Psychological
Clinic was housed in a frame building some
distance removed from Emerson Hall, the
seat of the philosophy department, which
included psychology. Teaching as well as
research and clinical work was done at the
Clinic, which under the leadership of
Henry Murray became something of a hotbed
for deviant ideas. Freud, Jung, Piaget, and
various other European psychologists were
studied there, as was the new dynamic
psychology of Murray. Students developed
strong loyalties to the Clinic and grew
passionate about its distinguishing ideas.
Emerson Hall, where the tried and true in
psychology was laid claim to, tended to be
regarded as enemy territory. A student who
had done his dissertation at the Clinic
prepared for his oral examination by
mobilizing his aggression.
_

P.

757

Murray (1938) believed that in a rough sense psychologists could be categorized into "peripheralists

"

and

:
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"centralists" (pp. 6ff ). The peripheralists represent the

paradigm presently in favor among psychologists; it includes
an "objectivistic inclination." Such psychologists are

"attracted to clearly observable things and qualities"
and are positivist ic

,

mechanistic, and elementaristic

The peripheralists are mostly academic
men addicted to the methodology of science.
Being chiefly interested in what is measurable, they are forced to limit themselves
to relatively unimportant fragments of the
personality or to the testing of specific
skills. The aim is to get figures that may
be worked statistically.
P.

The centralists,

in contrast,

9

"are especially attracted

to subjective facts of emotional or purposive significance."

They are "conceptualists rather than positivists"

arid

are

holists who "believe that personality is a complex unity,
of which each function is merely a partially distinguished

integral." Centralists trust empathic intuition and ex-

plain human functioning in dynamic

term??.

While the research Murray and his colleagues pursued
c

in Explora t ions was sufficiently varied to include pro*

cedures both peripheralist and centralist, Murray's own

work falls clearly in the centralist category. Murray was
skeptical of the tendency he observed among psychologists
to assert their credibility as scientists. This skepti-

cism must be due in part to Murray's own broad professional
experience in biology, chemistry, and medicine, which
taught him that science was not a matter of specific

.

:

-

.

6

procedures nor even specific instruments,
but rather a
process that must always reflect the
'demand characteristics' of its subject matter. Consider his
(1938)state-

ment
Some psychologists have an almost religious attachment to physical apparatus taken
over from the fundamental disciplines: physics,
chemistry, and physiology. Working with such
contrivances they have the 'feel' of being
purely scientific, and thus dignified. Sometimes this is nothing but a groundless fantasy,
since what has made these methods scientific
is the fact that applied to other objects they
have yielded answers to important questions.
It is dubious whether many crucial problems
in psychology can be solved by instruments.
Certainly if physical appliances do not give
results which lead to conceptual understanding,
it is not scientific to employ them. For the
all important characteristic of a good scientific method is its efficiency in revealing
general truths
f

p.
V/e

26

see in Murray's case, as we had in Allport's, a

willingness

to

question the conception of science other-

wise capturing the field of psychology. This quality of

standing apart, of seeing a need for a new way of studyin

human subjects, underscores the contention

I

am making,

that as formulated originally, personality psychology

offered a paradigm

— or

the first gropings of a paradigm-

quite distinct from what had been passed down from the

battles among the major traditions of American psychology
and which now has carried the day even among personality

psychologists
Murray's position is clearly maverick. His formal

s

.
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undergraduate training in psychology, unlike
Allport's,
was cut short by, ironically enough, Hugo
MUnsterberg*

I

course at Harvard:
At college a bud of interest in psychology
was nipped by the chill of Professor Munsterberg's approach. In the middle of his second
lecture I began looking for the nearest
exit
19^0; p. 152
?.1urray

pursued a career in medicine and science, and his

I

work led him to wonder "why some of the men with whom
I

was associated at the Rockefeller Institute clung

so tenaciously to diametrically opposing views about the

simplest phenomena." Murray's curiosity led him to Jung's

Psychological Types

,

which so impressed him he arranged

a visit with Jung in 1925.

To this meeting Murray

attributes his change of professions into psychology:
visited Dr. Jung
in Zurich supposedly to discuss abstractions;
but in a day or two to my astonishment enough
affective stuff erupted to invalid a pure
scientist. This was my first opportunity to
weigh psychoanalysis in a balance; and I recommend it as one method of measuring the worth
of any brand of psychology. Take your mysteries,
your knottiest dilemmas, to a fit exponent of
a system and judge the latter by its power
to order and illuminate your whole being. This
assuredly is a most exacting test, to apply the
touchstone of your deep perplexity to a theory,
to demand that it interpret what you presumably
know best yourself. 3ut then, what good is a
theory that folds up in a crisis? In deciding
such a test, of course, the temperament and talent
of the psychologist (or physician) are often
more important than his system; but a healthy
and critical inquirer capable of some detachment
may succeed in approximately weighing out this
On the crest of a wave

—

I

.

influence, In 1925, however, I had no scales
to weigh out Dr. Jung, the first full-blooded,
spherical— and Goethian, 1 should day— intelligence I had ever met, the man whom the judicious Prinzhorn called "the ripest fruit on
the tree of psycho-analytic knowledge." We
talked for hours, sailing down the lake and
smoking before the hearth of his Faust ian
retreat, "The great flood-gates of the wonderworld swung open," and I saw things that my
philosophy had never dreamt of. Within a
month a score of bi-horned problems were
resolved, and I went off decided on depth
psychology. I had experienced the unconscious,
something not drawn out of books.
19^0;

p.

153

Murray, then, came to personality not through a

socialization within psychology, but from the outside,
a pattern not unusual among personality theorists

(e.g.,

Kelly, Rogers), and suggestive of how independ-

ence from the orthodox paradigm comes about. Morton
Prince, director of the Harvard Psychological Clinic,

pro

vided Murray with a position. As Murray (19^0) note3,
"No man more ignorant of textbook

knowledge was ever

admitted to a department of psychology; but Professor
Boring was a liberal and

I

stayed" (p. l^'O

Murray' 3 initial reactions to academic psychologists
at work indicate his own distance from the reigning

presuppositions concerning the proper study of Mani
At firr;t I was taken aback, having vaguely
expected that most academic psychologists would
be interested in Mian functioning in his environment. But not at all: almost everyone was
nailed down to some piece of apparatus, measuring a small segment of the nervous system as

65

the^osufon

80 1
!

^^

^

? he e ^ails.

I

was in

ors are eye, ear, nose,
and throat specialist
P
int
ed m * were n" rationed,
since "hesff e
n0t+ susc ePtible to exact
exper
iSn?«? ,rf?-5 S? 0
a standa^ d that rules out
?'
SiSii
eeoloSv
o
Paleontology,
anthropology, embryology,
^
most af.
of medicine, sociology, and
devine astronm ? hl
* ira had b een to "work with
She
f?
™li + lL lscientific
greatest
precision" I would never havp
quit electrolytes and gases. I
had changed became
of a consuming interest in other
matter?! in
problems of motivation and emotion.
work these out on human subjects was To try to
to become
a
literary or applied psychologist, a
itioner of mental hygiene, outside and practlooking
in upon the real psychologists who,
I
were obsessed by anxious aims to climb concluded,
the
S( al
scientists
and
join the elect of
°/
this day ? s .uod at any cost. What else
could
account for their putting manners (appliances
and statistics) so far ahead of ends
(importance
of the problems studied)? No matter how
trivial
th e> conclusions, if his coefficients
were
reliable, an experimenter was deemed pure and

-^

sanctified.

19^0;

p.

154

And what procedures had Murray to offer to replace the

isolated studies of segments of the nervous system? Like
Allport, Murray was fairly open to any procedure that would

provide information about personhood. Murray believed that
an adequate understanding of a person would take the

form of a total life record or biographical understanding;

among the techniques employed in the 1938 study—which
sought to generate a theory of personality on the basis
of two-year interviews of 50 normally functioning persons--

was the psychological autobiography. Murray's team employed

structured interviews, questionnaires, symbolic play tech-

"

:
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niques (Erik Homburger, later Srikson,
participated in
Murray's project), musical reverie
experiences, and a
host of other inventive procedures. Murray
developed
and employed the Thematic Apperceptive
Test (TAT), a pro-

jective devise designed to bring to the surface
indications
of the subject's subconscious needs and concerns.
The use of many of these techniques, especially the
TAT,

carries the implicit expectation that the important

data of personality are found at a remove from direct,

superficial scrutiny. The person is not suited especially
to simple,

external calibration. Murray was, after all,

a believer in the dynamic role played by unconscious,

inner elements of self, as the following statement (19^0)

vividly suggests
can hardly think myself back tc the myopia
that once so seriously restricted my view of
human nature, so natural has it become for me
to receive impressions of wishes, dramas and
assumptions that underlie the acts and talk of
everyone I meet. Instead of seeing merely a
groomed American in a business suit, travelling
to and from his office like a rat in a maze, a
predatory, ambulating apparatus of reflexes,
habits, stereotypes, and slogans, a bundle of
consistencies, conformities, and allegiances
to this or that institution a robot in other
words--I visualize (just as I visualize the
activity of his internal organs) a flow of
powerful subjective life, conscious and unconscious; a whispering gallery in which voices
I

—

In stressing the importance of the subconscious
Murray chiefly takes issue with Allpcrt. Murray cnce
remarked to me in a tone of merry incredulity that Allport
thought the subconscious influence "was no larger than

a pea.
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160-161

Murray's skepticism that much of an understanding of

personhood could ever come from obsessive concerns with

scientific-seeming techniques and procedures, his contempt for the externalized view of the individual which,
as he remarks,

converts one into a "robot," and his

emphasis upon the multifaceted arena of subjective, inner
life all mark Murray's approach as deviant from the para-

digm that guides and determines research and thinking in

personality psychology today.
But what is even more distinguishing is Murray's

implicit assumption that the goal of the disciple is an

understanding of personhood which, as

I

hope becomes

increasingly apparent, is not the same thing as--is not
a necessary consequence of--the prediction and control of
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behavior through the use of personality variables.
Like
Allport, Murray believed in the holistic nature
of per-

sonality, and thus stressed personality organization.
Murray
focus upon the person as such is suggested by his use of

"personology" to replace "psychology of personality,

"

which he (1938) considered a ''clumsy and tautological
expression"

(p.

k)

,

Much attention has been placed upon establishing

both Allport and Murray's independence from today's
paradigm, because the two of them pioneered the field
of personality.

Hall and Lindzey's (1970) widely respected

text is dedicated to Allport and Murray (as well as to

Edward Tolman). Daniel Levinson, in his preface to

Rychlak's (1968) A Philosophy
Theory

,

notes

of

Science for Personalit y

:

The study of personality was estbalished as
a legitimate field only in the late 193°'s,
primarily through the writings of Allport,
Lew in, and Murray and through the entry cf
psychoanalysis into the academic scene.
p.

viii

The presuppositions underlying the study of person-

ality as it began with Allport and Murray differ from
those in force today; these differences include both
the overall conceptualization of personhood as well as
the discipline's major goals.
Do Allport and Murray alone establish the existence

1

"
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of a paradigm predating today's? The case will
now be

argued that their personalistic paradigm extended to other,
more recent personality psychologists.

%

aim is to estab-

lish the existence of an independent personality paradigm, now more or less forgotten.

Kelly
as noted,

.

A personality theorist whose career pattern,

is typical of the breed is George Kelly, whose

reputation was established by the 1955 publication of
The

Psychology of Personal Constructs. Like Murray, Kelly

was not charmed by the psychology he encountered as an

undergraduate in the American midwest, in his case the

behaviorism of the 1920's. He writes

(

Mahar

,

1969):

In the first course in psychology that I
took I sat in the back row of a very large

class, tilted my chair against the wall, made
myself as comfortable as possible, and kept
one ear cocked for anything interesting that
might turn up. One day the professor, a very
nice person who seemed to be trying hard to
convince himself that psychology was something
to be taken seriously, turned to the blackboard and wrote an "S," an arrow, and an "R.
Thereupon I straightened up my chair and listened, thinking to myself that now, after two
or three weeks of preliminaries, we might be
getting to the meat of the matter.
Although I listened intently for several
sessions after that the most I could make of
it was that the "S" was what you had to have
in order to account for the "R" and the "R"
was put there so the "3" would have something
to account for. I never did find out what that
arrow stood for--not to this day- -and I have
pretty well given up trying to figure it out.
I can see, of course, that once you step into
this solipsism you can go round and round
without feeling obligated to come up with
anything useful.
pp. ^6-^7
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Kelly's impatience with psychology led him away
to

other fields, to math and physics, sociology,
and education.
His dissertation in 1931 concerned common factors
in

speech and hearing disorders. He came back to psychology

much as did Murray. With his fresh Ph.D. he was given

responsibility for providing clinical psychology services
to the Kansas school system; he had no previous training

in clinical psychology.
No one will accuse Kelly of allegiance to the explan-

atory concepts of behaviorism, but his writing also makes
clear that the methodological presuppositions defining

today's behaviorist paradigm were also part of the solipsism Kelly did not care to go round and round in.
3ecause Kelly's conceptualization of the personal construct system is quite close to Kuhn's concept of paradigm,

it is hardly surprising that Kelly, himself,

identified and labelled the paradigm status of behaviorist psychology:
Cut of all this I have gradually developed
the notion that psychology is pretty much confined to the paradigms it employs and, while
you can take off in a great many directions
and travel a considerable distance in any one
of them as indeed we have with stimulusresponse psychology there is no harm in consorting with a strange paradigm now and then.
Indeed the notion has occurred to me that
psychology may best be regarded as a collection of paradigms wooed by ex-physicists, exphysiologists, and ex-preachers, as well as a
lot of other intellectual renegades...

—

—

Kahar, 1969; p.

L

W
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Kelly was, not surprisingly, aware— admirably aware-of the consequences of subscribing to a paradigm.

Illus-

trating his distance from the presuppositions of the
behavior ist personality paradigm is, thus, relatively
easy. Regarding the sanctity of physics-like procedures,

Kelly (1958) notes:
There is nothing especially revelational
about events that happen in an experimental
laboratory—other events that happen elsewhere
are just as real and are just as worthy of
attention. Even the fact that an event took
place in a manner predicted by the experimenter
gives it no particular claim to being a
special revelation from nature. That an experimenter's predictions come true means only that
he has hit upon one of many possible systems
for making predictions that come true. He may
be no more than a wee bit closer to a genuine
understanding of things as they really are.
Indeed, the fact that he has hit upon one such
way of predicting outcomes may even blind him
to alternatives which might have proved far
more productive in the long run.
P.

35

Especially noteworthy in Kelly's remark is the implied

distinction between one's ability to make predictions and
one's genuine understanding of one's subject matter. We

have encountered this implication before. It is typical
of today's behaviorist paradigm to equate explanation with

the capacity to predict and control; more characteristic
of what

I

am calling the personalistic personality para-

digm is an equating of explanation with meaningful under-

standing—with insights into the nature of personhood.
Throughout the passages included from the writings of

j

Allport, Murray, and Kelly is the implication that the

understanding of personhood is the field's goal.
But returning to Kelly's specific independence from
the behaviorist paradigm, we find support again in his

remarks concerning the enchantment of psychologists with

operational definition:
The writing of the physicist Bridgeman
has had considerable influence among psychological theorists. There has been a new
emphasis upon the need for operational definition of the variables envisioned in one's
experiments. Carried to the extreme that some
psychologists would carry it, this would mean
that no theoretical statement could be made
unless each part referred to something palpable. It is this kind of extremism which has
led to the quip that while psychiatrists
would rather be abstruse than right, psychologists would rather be wrong than abstruse.
1955; P. 28

Beyond questioning the positivistic certainty of

experimental predictions and operational definition, Kelly
does not interpret the prediction and control of behav-

ior—indeed, the role of behavior--as the great criterion of verification so characteristic of today's paradigm. According to Kelly (Mahar, 1969

),

explaining

behavior is not the important question:
The languages of western Europe are constructed so as to imply that the logic of
explaining behavior is based on the S-R unit.
This is to say that the behavioral cycle with
which we are concerned is one that starts
with a stimulus and asks the question, "What
response will ensue?" In effect this means that
the stimulus is the question and the response
This model is implicit in
is the answer.
Freudian theory and indeed it is implicit in
most dynamic theories. Behavior is the answer;
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it is the thing we are seeking to
produce. In
psychotherapy the object is to get the patient
to change his behavior. In learning, also,
the
object is to get the student to change his behavior. In industry the object is to get the employee
to do his job. In politics the object is
to get

the citizen to support the leadership. Once
you
are able to produce the behavior you are seeking,
you have your answer. Indeed, most psychologists
like to say that they are primarily concerned
with the production of behavior. I think this is
very sad.
But from the standpoint of personal construct
theory, behavior is not the answer, it is the
question. The personal construct theorist who
serves in the psychotherapeutic capacity does
not consider his objective the production of
certain classes of behavior. He is concerned,
rather, with the constructions that man, including himself and his patient, places upon that
world and how these constructions are tested
out. For him, behavior is not the answer, it is
the principal way in which man may inquire
into the validity of his constructions.
pp.

219-220

Kelly's distinction between the behavior of a person
and his inner construction of experience

reality

— is

— his

subjective

reminiscent of Murray's emphasis; indeed, of

Allport's as well.
Note that associated with the rejection of behavior
as a criterion of verification, with the refusal to adopt
a physicalistic methodology, we find a consistent interest

in understanding the person from an "inner" or subjective

standpoint. What is taking shape is a clearer demarcation
of the two paradigms in terms of the conceptual fruit they
bear.

If,

as Kelly's personality theory suggests,

our very

psychological natures reflect the constructs we employ, it

.
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may be that the behaviorist paradigm
gives rise not only
to an impoverished model of personhood,
but also to an

impoverished experience of self. Something of the
flavor of
this argument is conveyed in the following
passage from
one of Kelly's final articles:
A psychology that pins its anticipations on
the repetitions of events it calls "stimuli,"
or on the concatenations of events it calls
"reinforcements," can scarcely hope to survive
as man's audacities multiply. More and more it
will find its accurate predictions confined
to the trivialities of man's least imaginative
moments and to the automatisms of persons given
in to despair. It seems to me that most of what
we know as "modern psychology" is a monotonous
tale told of men left behind by the quickening
tempo of human undertakings. It is such men, and
such men only I suspect, who enact nothing save
what has been reinforced, who are carried on
by the momentum of their biographies rather
than compose their diaries afresh each day, and
who become transfixed by their identities. And
yet I doubt that there are ever men who are
altogether like this. Perhaps it only seems that
way from listening to psychologists.

Kahar,1969;
Is

it too extreme a statement to suggest that,

PP.

31-32

at times,

it only seems that way from being a psychologist?

Mas low. Kelly is not alone among the "second gener-

ation" personality psychologists to escape the behaviorist
paradigm. We may include the obvious example of Abraham
Maslow, psychology's reknown humanist, who lobbied against
the confinements traditional methodology

traditional methodology--imposes

— what

has become
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Mas low saw great danger in psychology's method-

centeredness--or "means centeredness,

"

as he termed it.

Psychology should develop its methods to suit important
problems, not attack the problems for which its methods

happen to be suited:
Means-centered scientists tend, in spite of
themselves, to fit their problems to their
techniques rather than the contrary Their beginning question tends to be Which problems can
I attack with the techniques and equipment I
now possess?rather than what it should more
often be, Which are the most pressing, the most
crucial problems I could spend my time on? How
else explain the fact that most run-of-the-mill
scientists spend their lifetimes in a small
area whose boundaries are defined, not by a
basic question about the world, but by the limit
of a piece of apparatus or of a technique? In
psychology, few people see any humor in the
concept of an "animal psychologist" or a "statistical psychologist," i.e., individuals who
do not mind working with any problem so long as
they can use, respectively, their animals or
their statistics. Ultimately this must remind us
of the famous drunk who looked for his wallet,
not where he had lost it, but under the street
lamp, "because the light is better there," or
of the doctor who gave all his patients fits
because that was the only sickness he knew
how to cure.
.

1970; p.

13

Maslow saw himself working within and prosyletizing
for a philosophy of science distinctly different from

that characteristic of the psychology of his day:
We must help the "scientific" psychologists
to realize that they are working on the basis
of a philosophy of science, not the philosophy of science, and that any philosophy of
science which serves primarily an excluding
function is a set of blinders, a handicap
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rather than a help. All the world, all of experience must be open to study. Nothing not even
the "personal" problems, need be closed off from
human investigation. Otherwise we will force
ourselves into the idiotic position that some
labor unions have frozen themselves into; where
only carpenters may touch wood, and carpenters
may touch only wood, not to mention that if
carpenters do touch it, it is ipso facto wood,
honorary wood, so to speak. New materials and
new methods must then be annoying and even threatening, catastrophes rather than opportunities.
I remind you also of the primitive tribes who
must place everyone in the kinship system. If a
newcomer shows up who cannot be placed, there
is no way to solve the problem but to kill him.
,

1968a; p. 218

These passages suggest,

I

think accurately, that

Maslow's view of the process of normal science is close
to Kuhn's: a dominent paradigm establishes a reign of

puzzle solving, where what constitutes a valid puzzle is
predetermined,- Mas low was keenly aware that the present

methodological prejudices exclude important questions,
exclude them by pronouncing them unsolvable, unposable,
or unscientific. As does Kuhn, Maslow notes (Maddi and

Costa,

1972) the process whereby new psychologists are

socialized into the presuppositions of the current paradigm:
turns away from
Most graduate training.
(topics like love, hate, hope, fear). They
are called fuzzy, unscientific, tenderminded,
mystical. What is offered instead? Dry bones.
Techniques. Precision. Huge mountains of ittybitty facts, having little to do with the
interests that brought the student into psychology. Even worse, they try, most often success,

.
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fully, to make the student ashamed of his interests as if they were somehow unscientific.
And
so often the spark is lost, the fine
impulses of
youth are lost and they settle down to being
members of the guild, with all its prejudices,
its orthodoxies.
P.

37

A large part of the deadening orthodoxy concerns the
same physicalistic conception of science and technique that
we have counted as fundamental to today's paradigm and which

has been rejected by the critiques of Allport, Murray and
Kelly. Mas low (1970) states:

Inevitable stress on elegance, polish
technique, and apparatus has as a frequent
consequence a playing down of meaningfulness
vitality, and significance of the problem and
of creativeness in general Almost any candidate
for the Ph.D. in psychology will understand
what this means in practice. A methodologically
satisfactory experiment, whether trivial or
not, is rarely criticized. A bold, groundbreaking problem, because it may be a "failure,"
is too often criticized to death before it is
ever begun. Indeed criticism in the scientific
literature seems largely to mean only criticism
of method, technique, logic, etc. I do not
recall seeing, in the literature with which I
am familiar, any paper that criticized another
paper for being unimportant, trivial, or
inconsequential.
,

,

.

pp.

11-12

Maslow attempted to forge a philosophy of science
for psychology that was suited to the original concerns
of personality psychology, namely the understanding of

personhood. He explicitly saw himself establishing a new
way, or Third Force, in psychology:
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In the thirties

I became interested in certain psychological problems, and found that they
could not be answered or managed well by the
classical scientific structure of the time (the
behavioristic, positivistic , "scientific, " valuefree , mechanomorphic psychology). I was raising
legitimate questions and had to invent another
approach to psychological problems in order to
deal with them. This approach slowly became a
general philosophy of psychology, of science in
general, of religion, work, management, and
now biology. As a matter of fact, it became
a Weltanschauung.

1971; P. 3

Central to Maslow's new psychology were elements

already existent in the work of Allport and Murray: a respect for the reality of inner experience

subjective experience

— and

— that

is to say,

a reliance upon investigative

procedures that enable researchers to encounter that inner
experience.

In Maslow's case,

the unstructured interview

figured prominently. A sense of how Maslow proceeded is

suggested by his (1968b) remarks concerning his research
on human sexuality, for which he interviewed women:

But women are really kind of perpetual
miracles. They are like flowers, even old
ladies. Every person is a mystery to me,
but women are more mysterious to me than men.
So any woman is a fascinating mystery to
question for endless hours.
I interviewed 120 women with a new form of
interview. No notes; we just talked along
until I got some feeling for the personality,
then put sex against the background,
P.

5^

Maslow's depiction of self-actualization is based not
only upon the lives of historical persons (e.g., Lincoln),

.
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but also upon some casual, one must suppose, or at least
informal and indirect interviews of persons Mas low knew
and admired.

It is noteworthy to add that Mas low's

(1970)

discussion of self-actualizers provokes more lively and
insightful discussion in undergraduate personality classes
than any piece of traditionally- inspired personality re-

search
In

am aware of.**

I

addition to departing from the methodological

prescriptions so central to the behaviorist paradigm of

contemporary psychology, Mas low wasted little time concerning himself with the prediction and control of behavior,
another piller of the current paradigm. His view is close
to Kelly's, holding that behavior in and of itself is of

little relevance or importance to the personality psycho-

should be noted that Maslow certainly did not
champion an unscientific approach to research; rather, he
hoped to broaden psychologists' conception of science. In
his preface to the first edition of To ward a Psychology
of Being Maslow (1968a) wrote, "It Is clear to me that
scientific methods (broadly conceived) are our only ultimate ways of being sure that we do_ have the truth" (p.viii).
Maslow did not depart from the traditional notion of
research without some doubts: "My study of self-actualizing
persons has worked out very well— to my great relief, I
must confess. It was, after all, a great gamble, doggedly
pursuing an intuitive conviction and, in the process,
defying'some of the basic canons of scientific method
and of philosophical criticism. These were, after all, rules
which I myself had believed and accepted, and I was very
much aware that I was skating on thin ice. Accordingly,
my explorations proceeded against a background of anxiety,
conflict, and self-doubt" (1970; p. xxi
It

,

)

logist; behavior is not the end we seek:

3ehavior. .is means rather than end, i.e.,
it gets things done in this world. It is a
question whether the exclusion of subjective
states as a legitimate object of psychological
study does not, a priori, make difficult or
even impossible the solution of the problem
we are discussing. Ends as I see them are very
frequently subjective experiences of satisfaction. Without reference to the fact that
most instrumental behaviors have human worth
only because they bring about these subjective end-experiences, the behavior itself often
becomes scientifically senseless. Behaviorism
itself may be understood better if it is seen
as one cultural expression of the general
Puritan striving and achieving point of view
we have already mentioned. This implies that
to its various other failings must now be added
ethnocentrism.
.

1970; pp. 233-234

Maslow, Kelly, Murray, and Allport

represent a

personological tradition in personality psychology

— what

can be defended as the original paradigm of the field,
the paradigm that defined the subject matter in the first

place. Their lives and work suggest that independence

from the paradigms of psychology external to personality
is most easily accomplished by avoiding the socialization

of a standard psychology education, although independence
is certainly possible even for those traditionally educ-

ated.

In fact,

the death of the personological paradigm

Maslow' s (1968b) initial reaction to Watsonian
behaviorism reads like Skinner's: "Life didn't really
start for me until I got married and went to Wisconsin.
Watson and I was sold on BehaviorI had discovered J .3
.
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can be directly related to the
socialization up-andcoming members of the field receive,
for it is typically
true that one is now socialized as
a psychologist first,
before one specializes in personality.

But here

I

am getting ahead of my argument. Before

discussing how the personological tradition was
eradicated from academic psychology, we had best
summarize
the distinguishing features of that tradition.
The theories of these four men differ significantly,

but they share some presuppositions in common which contrast sharply with those characteristic of American academic psychology today. As discussed, they explicitly

challenged the methodology reigning in the rest of psychology. Each of these theorists

(and the list is not meant

ism. It was an explosion of excitement for me. Bertha came
to pick me up and I was dancing down Fifth Avenue with
exuberance; I embarrassed her, but I was so excited about
Watson's program. It was beautiful" (p. 37).
What brought Mas low to renounce behaviorism were
further reading and increased life experience. He attributed his conversion to reading Freud, gestalt psychology,
organismic psychology, 3ertalanffy, Whitehead, and
Bergson, and to studying the Rorschach Test. Beyond those
intellectual influences were some more personal observations "Then when my baby was born that was the thunderclap that settled things. I looked at this tiny, mysterious
thing and felt so stupid. I was stunned by the mystery
and by the sense of not really being in control, I felt
small and weak and feeble before all this, I'd say that
anyone who had a baby couldn't be a behaviorist" (p. 56).
:
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to be exhaustive) defined himself apart
from the main-

I

stream. The tradition of personality theorists
had alwavs
J

been to play a maverick role, to represent a
different

way of studying human nature.
The personological personality psychologists were

united in a common definition of their subject matter:
the understanding of personhood, which chiefly was under-

stood to refer to the elements of personality and their

organization and development. The kinds of questions they

addressed themselves to involved human nature and the
conditions of the good life. While they did not nec-

essarily attempt directly to answers these questions,
their sense of mission, their understanding of why the study
of personality was important, ultimately had to do with

human existence on this planet.
The personalistic personality psychologists were

theory-minded, while the behaviorist personality psychologists today, by contrast, are study-minded, or hypothe-

sis-minded. This difference underscores the former's

interest in the organization of the elements of person-

ality and the latter's desire to isolate personality variables that enable prediction and control equations.
The former viewed behavior as a peripheral issue,
as the tip of the personality iceberg, as it were; the

latter view behavior as the royal road to verification.

j

The former tend to be relatively open-minded and

creative in employing techniques and procedures, willing
to allow the questions they asked and their openness to

the richness of personhood to guide their experiment-

ation with procedures. Though certainly many adherents
of the behavior ist paradigm have been as creative and

open-minded in their individual researches, the behaviorist personality psychologists as a group have followed a

more inflexible, a priori formula of scientific pro-

cedure

.

The personalistic personality psychologist's goal

was the underst anding of personhood. Again and again we

find that word, understanding.

It is a

word that has in

some respects gone out of fashion with the ascendance of
the behaviorist paradigm.

Understanding has given way to the criterion of
prediction. Indeed, the nature of scientific explanation
itself, for today's paradigm, is intimately bound up

with prediction. Let us specifically raise the question,
What constitutes a scientific explanation?, for the

answer varies from one paradigm to the other, and the
issue is crucial for understanding how the very nature
of "being scientific" changes when a paradigm changes.
The nature of scientific explanation associated

with Hempel is expounded by Dray (1964), a philo-

.

8^

sopher of history:
Now scientific explanations themselves
may be given at various levels of sophistication. It seems generally to be agreed,
however, that insofar as they explain
particular occurrences .they have one crucial
feature in common: they render predictable
what is explained by subsuming it under
universal empirical laws. In ideal cases,

such subsumption exhibits a deductive
pattern: a statement asserting the occurence
of what is to be explained is shown to be
logically deducible from statements setting
forth certain antecedent conditions, together
with certain empirically verified general
laws
P.

5

This formulation will be recognized as an ideal held out
to students in their socialization as psychologists.
is familiar.

It

What might be overlooked is the qualification,

"that insofar as they explain particular occurrences!

"

it

seems to me that in employing this philosophy of science
we have forced ourselves to transform psychology into
a science dealing with particular occurrences, rather

than with personhood which is not especially particular.
The personality variables of today's research may be

seen as our manufacture of personality particles.
But let us focus on the relationship between this

formulation of scientific explanation and the role of
prediction. The philosopher of social science, Rudner
(1966), sheds light on the issue:
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The formal structure of a scientific
explanation of some specific event has
parts: first, a statement E describing three
some
event to be explained; second, a set
of statements Ci to C n describing specific relevant
circumstances that are antecedent to, o^
otherwise causally correlated with, the event
described by E; third, a set of lawlike statements Lj_ to Ln , universal generalizations
whose import is roughly, 'Whenever events of
the kind described by Ci to C take place, then
an event described by E takes n place.'
In order for these three sets of statements
actually to constitute an explanation of the
event, they must fulfill at least two conditions: first, the E statement must be deducible from the C and L statements together, but
not from either set alone, and second, the C
and L statements must be true.
p.

60

Rudner goes on to make explicit that this view of scientific explanation is closely bound up with the capacity
to make predictions; indeed:
It follows from these considerations that

we have an explanati on for an event i f and
only if Tfrom a different temporal vantage
point) we c ould have predicted it
p. 60
,

.

This view of scientific explanation is that of the

behaviorist paradigm.
digm's method

,

It goes to the heart of the para-

where method is understood not as tech-

niques and procedures but rather as the field's logic
of justification,

"the rationale on which it bases its

acceptance or rejection of hypotheses or theories."

Research today aims at the prediction and control of
behavior because the capacity to predict is understood
to be synonymous with an adequate scientific explanation.
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The personalistic paradigm,

in contrast, presupposes

a different conception of scientific explanation.

I

can-

not formulate a statement of the personalistic conception
as well-focussed and polished as those of Dray and
Rudner,

and it may be that this alternative conception was, even
for them, the personalistic personality psychologists,

not always explicitly drawn. But time and time again we

find them speaking of understanding, and speaking of it
in contexts that clearly differentiate understanding from

prediction and control.
Consider Rogers's (1961) statement:
In approaching the complex phenomena of

therapy with the logic and methods of science,
the aim is to work toward an understanding
of the phenomenon. In science this means an
objective knowledge of events and of functional
relationships between events. Science may also
give the possibility of increased prediction of
and control over these events, but this is
not a necessary outcome of scientific
endeavor.
pp. 205-206
The conception of scientific explanation embodied in the

personalistic tradition results in different kinds of
expectations concerning a satisfactory scientific account
of personality.

Personalistic psychologists expected the

scientific process to end in important understandings,
not replicable predictions.
The complacent certainty with which these older

scientiftheorists are today condemned as insufficiently
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ic derives from the position associated
with Hempel; why

listen to Hernpel? Even within the field of philosophy
of science these issues are debated,
Peter Winch, as early as 1958 in The Idea of a Social

Science and

i ts

Relation to Phil osophy identifies the very

issue of meaningfulness

,

virtually synonymous with the

understanding sought by the personalistic psychologists,
as the reason why the physicalistic conception of science
is

inappropriate for social science phenomena. A different

method, he makes clear, is necessary:
What in fact one is showing, however, is that
the central concepts which belong to our
understanding of social life are incompatible
with concepts central to the activity of scientific prediction. When we speak of the possibility of scientific prediction of social
developments of this sort, we literally do
not understand what we are saying. We cannot
understand it because it has no sense,
p.

9^

Winch's point comes to the heart of the matter: the desire
for understanding in the sense of a subjective satisfact-

ion is not what one gets from the method practiced by

psychologists today; indeed, the method practiced today
makes demands that legislate against that very sort of

understanding.
Closer to the position of the personalistic psych-

ologists is the verstehen idea of validation. Scientific

activity can be envisioned in which the empathic under-
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standing of the scientist is counted
as evidence that is
validating, in the same sense that
empirical predictions
are counted validational now.

I
I
t

i
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CHAPTER

IV

PARADIGM CHANGE IN PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY:
WAR OF THE
WORLD VIEWS

The previous chapter argued for the recognition
of
a paradigm in personality psychology
predating today's,
a personalistic paradigm dedicated to the
theoretical

understanding of personhood, a paradigm founded upon a
philosophy of science conducive to such an understanding.
Something happened, though. Personalistic personality

psychologists no longer constitute the heart of academic

personality psychology. Their names almost never appearin the references of the leading research journals.

Indicative of the changes that have taken place are the

complaints expressed by Carlson's (1971) article, whose
title itself is revealing,

'Where is the Person in

Personality Research?".
Carlson, reviewing all the articles appearing in the

Journal of Personality and the Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology in 1968 (226 substantive articles) notes:
Obviously, no single scientist, no single
study, no single research tradition can possibly deal "scientifically'' with anything so
complex as a whcle person. But the attempt
can be made collectively and cumulatively.
The present impoverishment of personality
research is distressing because it suggests
that the goal of studying whole persons has
been abandoned.
p.

207

Among the factors distressing to Carlson are many

that follow logically and intelligibly from the presup-

positions of the behavior ist personality paradigm. First,
she points out (p. 205) that "experimental methods pre-

dominate in current research, with over half of the published studies employing manipulative procedures." Most
of the remaining designs are correlational. These kinds
of research are typically of the physicalistic, quant-

ified variety in which human data are briefly assessed-or assayed in the sense spoken of earlier--then simultan-

eously converted into numbers which, once translated
onto IBM cards, are fed into computers for analysis.
As anyone who has done a great amount of this kind

of research will testify, more time is usually spent,

more manipulations made, more concentration on the

researcher's part expended, after the data have been collected and quantified. For, once the data have been

converted into numbers, the experimenter essentially
begins to play mathematical games, all perfectly legitimate in terms of rules applying to the manipulations of
figures. For the rules of numbers are clear enough, and
one can sometimes argue a case with a significant chi-

square when a t-test of the same data fails to pan out.
The weakest link in much quantitative research is the

translation of human qualities into integral categories.
How angry is 7 on a ten-point anger scale?
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But once the researcher has his
7, the rest is

smooth sailing. And, after all,

"the light is better

there."
Carlson does not mention finding case
studies. She
also laments the discovery that most studies
elicit

hardly any information about their subjects:
Extremes of a "comprehensiveness" dimension are represented by studies in which
subjects left no trace of their personal
participation, merely contributing isolated
bits of behavior to a data pool, and a few in
which subjects provided exhaustuve data on a
battery of tests and biographical inventories.
However, the typical study represented an
individual in terms of his ex (sometimes),
treatment condition, performance scores, and
ratings of partner or experimenter in posttest inquiry. Although the literature as a
whole has elicited a wide range of potentially
important information about persons, no
single investigation either noted or utilized
much information about any individual subject.
Thus the task performances of subjects in
current research remain uninterpretable as
personality data in the absense of anchoring
information.
p.

206

What Carlson is noting here is the effect of the para-

digm change, which has converted the focus of personality research from the understanding of the person as a

whole to the attempt to predict and control on the basis
of hypothetical personality variables. The studies she

reviewed do not need much information about each subject;
they need, essentially, an assay of the hypothetical

variable and something to predict on the basis of it
(performance ratings).
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A related observation by Carlson concerns
how little

time is actually spent with individual subjects:
The time span of contemporary inquiry is
short. The vast majority of published work
was based upon a single session; less than
one fifth of reported studies involved more
than a two-week period, and rarer still were
the few studies involving follow-up over significant periods of time.
p. 206

The presupposition that natural science techniques can

be employed profitably on human subjects has already

been noted. How long does it take to determine a solution's

temperature? How time consuming is the assessment of a
mineral's specific gravity?
Carlson also notes that no attention is paid to
the organization of personality or to changes occur-

ring over time

:

We cannot study the organization of personality because we know at most only one or
two "facts" about any subject. We cannot
study the stability of personality nor its
development over epochs of life, because we
see our subjects for an hour.
P. 207
Of course we cannot

I

These are not especially import-

ant (visible) problems in terms of the current paradigm's

world view.

In fact,

Carlson's complaint is only a

complaint from the point of view of the personalistic
paradigm.

It

comes as no surprise to read that Carlson

quotes Maddi's (1968) definition of the field of person-

.

.

.

,
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ality, for Maddi, co-author of

Hu^ij^i^

Allport, Maslow. and Murray, was himself
a student of
both Allport and Murray who, indeed, is one
of very few

personality psychologists still to employ the
term
personologist 13
.

Indeed, Carlson quotes Murray himself:

Over 30 years ago, Murray (1938) noted
that
The reason why the results of so many
researches in personality have been misleading
or trivial i s that experimenters have
failed to
obtain enough pertinent information
about their
subjects. Lacking these facts, accurate
generalizations are impossible, (p.ix)." This comment
could stand as a summary of current work--with
the important amendment that the accumulation
of more "facts" (including much
unassimilated
data collected through Explorations in Personality ) has not provided, nor is likely to
provide, the basic generalizations needed in
this
field.
P.

213

J

Maddi's definition: "The personologist is interested
in the commonalities ajnong people (as well
in universals
in the att empt to ident ify and classify diff erences
as
among p eople ... The personologistTs rather" unusual in not
restricting himself to behavior easily traceable to social
and biological pressures of the moment ... Of all the social
and biological scientists, then, the perso no logist believes
most deeply in the complexity and individuality of life
his emp ha sis (is) upon ch aracter istics ... that show continuity in time... that seem to have psycholog ical importance
that have some ready reTationship to the major goals
and directions of the person's life... The personologist
is interested in all rather than only some of the psychological behaviors of the person. .. Finally, personologists ..
are primarily interested in the adult human being... the
fruit of development a congealed personality that exerts
a Dervasive influence on present and future behavior"
.

) .

.

.

.

.

.

—

(1968? pp. 6-9).

.

,
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Carlson complains that "problems are
posed by current
research conventions" (p. 210), but the
problems she describes are the natural expression in
research of the pre-

I

suppositions of today's behaviorist personality
paradigm. Her complaint stands as evidence
that things have

changed in personality psychology. Prom
the days of the
lengthy case study (White's Lives in Progress
Murray's
.

Explorations in Personal]^, Allport's Letters fr om
Jenny)
we now find ourselves in the midst of a literature on
the

basis of which one can ask, where is the person in person-

ality research? Something happened: a paradigm change.
Kuhn (1970a) has adopted an evolutionary metaphor
for this process of paradigm change, a metaphor seemingly

justified by the role he accords anomaly in the cycle of
a science's development.

For an anomaly, however unintended,

is a result of the paradigm it ultimately brings down.

Kuhn equates a paradigm with a way of construing the world,
and his model of a science's development could be phrased
as follows: a new paradigm realizes a new world,

one with

a certain amount of unexplored promise; normal science is

the exploration of that world. A "good" paradigm is a

reality that for the most part works

:

allowing the formul-

ation of solvable problems. But no paradigm will fit
perfectly, and eventually a paradigm will come up against
its own limits. At this point the community of scholars
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confronts anomaly. Eventually a new way of realizing the

world will be proposed that will solve the problem--or
dissolve the impasse— and the crisis will subside and
the field will have adapted.
3ut did the paradigm revolution in personality

psychology occur because the personalistic paradigm
foundered on its own anomaly? Although Kuhn's depiction of normal revolutionary science would lead us to sus-

pect so,

I

doubt that such is the case.

Is

there any

evidence of a crisis in the original paradigm? Were there

unsolvable problems which the adoption of the behaviorist

personality paradigm dissolved?

I

think not.

We have earlier discussed the distortion of history
in which a field under the influence of a new paradigm

indulges, so to consider whether the personalistic

paradigm ended in crisis we must especially be on guard
against a false sense of history.
Specifically, we can expect researchers today to

take for granted the speedy downfall into crisis and

anomaly of the personalistic paradigm's research, where
that impression derives from the method of empirical

prediction and control. What, after all, did Explorations
in Personality prove? What was established by Letters

From Jenny? The dogma is that the formulations of the

personality theorists never did

— nor

could--stand up to

.
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the criterion of empirical testing.
But such an application of that
criterion is, as

I

have suggested, anachronistic. We
project backwards the
criterion we currently employ, and erase the
memory that

different criteria of science were in vogue
then. What
needs to be demonstrated is the presence of crisis

in the

personalistic paradigm in its own terms

.

Was there inter-

nal recognition of crisis and anomaly?
There is evidence to suggest no such crisis. At their

deaths neither Allport, Maslow, nor Kelly had recanted.
On the contrary. Murray,

in retirement,

is at work on

a psychological biography of Melville which,

one presumes,

suggests a continuing interest in the person as a whole,
as well as in the biography as the proper unit of

analysis
But such evidence of continued allegiance to an old

paradigm constitutes only a weak case. Kuhn himself has

suggested that even during normal revolutionary change
there will be old men who never make the transition to the
new paradigm.
Yet other evidence that the personalistic paradigm

did not fail in its own terms is available. One line of

evidence is speculative but fascinating. During World
War II Murray was placed in charge of the selection of

candidates for the Office of Strategic Servies, the OSS,
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forerunner of the Central Intelligence
Agency. The assessment procedures developed by Lt. Colonel
Murray and his
staff, recounted in Assessment of

Ifen

.

published in 1948,

I

are not far different from those employed
in the Explorat ions study, at least in terms of format;
for example,
in both subjects are placed unwittingly
in frustrating

situations to determine their reactions under stress.
That Murray should have served as the first chief

psychologist for what has become the C.I. A. is curious,
and one wonders whether his approach has met with more
success there than it has in academic psychology.

I

believe

there are indications that Murray's personalistic approach

exerts a continuing impact today, however banished it

may now be from universities.
What makes me think so is the text of the C.I. A.

report to President Nixon describing Daniel Ellsburg,
leaked to the press during the aftermath of the Watergate
Scandal. The terms of this psychological description are

hardly those of the quantified form typical of today's

research and conceptualizations. Instead are suggested
the old Murray needs and press, the complexes and

dynamic interactions

:

This indirect personality assessment is
based primarily on background material and
current impressions derived from press reports, including newspaper and magazine

.

98

inte rviews. m addition,
^Ll^^i™
De P artmen ^ and Federal
Bureau of
Invpot?!^
memoranda have been reviewed. As
thl dUf £
men ^Y and there has been
So
W+ cl nicalf™Zvaluation
of the

selected
d

6

?

?

S

-

subject,
i
this iSS?
n
a ? sessment should be considered
hiihlv 2j£!??la
ln no
definitive.
Tht?
r
nothing
to
suggest in the material
!
MV
su Je
suffers from a seri s
£StS
er ln
e SenSe
f bein
P^chotic
-!?
2nd
and St
?n
K
out i?
of touch with reality.° There S
gestions, however, that some of his are suglong-standing personality needs were
intensified by psychPressures of the mid-life period and that
thlS
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this may have contributed significantly
to his
recent actions.
An extremely intelligent and talented
individual, subject apparently early made
his brilliance evident. It seems likely that there
were
substantial pressures to succeed and that subject early had instilled in him
expectations of
success, that he absorbed the impression that
he
was special and destined for greatness. And
indeed
he did attain considerable academic success and
seemed slated for a brilliant career.
There has been a notable zealous intensity
about the subject throughout his career. Apparently finding it difficult to tolerate ambiguity and ambivalence, he was either strongly for
something or strongly against it. There were
suggestions of problems in achieving full success,
for although his ideas glittered, he had trouble
committing himself in writing.
He had a knack for drawing attention to himself and at early ages had obtained positions of
considerable distinction, usually attaching himself as a "bright young man " to an older and
experienced man of considerable stature who was
attracted by his brilliance and flair.
3ut one can only sustain the role of "bright
young man" so long. Most men between the ages of
35 and 4-5 go through a period of reevaluation.
Realizing that youth is at an end, that many of
their golden dreams cannot be achieved, many men
transiently drift into despair at this time.
In an attempt to escape from these feelings
of despair and to regain a sense of competence
and mastery, there is an increased thrust towards
new activity at this time. Thus this is a time
of career changes, of extramarital affairs and
divorce

^ SwJ

?
-

^
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It is a time

when many men come to doubt
their earlier commitments and are impelled to
strike out in new directions.
For the individual who is particularly
driven towards the heights of success and prominence, this mid-life period may be a particularly difficult time. The evidence reviewed
suggests that this was so for Sllsberg, a man
whose career had taken off like a rocket, but
who found himself at mid-life not nearly having
achieved the prominence and success he expected
and desired.
Thus it may well have been an intensified need
to achieve significance that impelled him to
release the Pentagon papers.
There is no suggestion that subject thought
anything treasonous in his act. Rather, he seemed
to be responding to what he deemed a higher order
of patriotism. His exclusion of the three volumes
of the papers concerned with the secret negotiations would support this.
Many of the subject's own words would confirm the impression that he saw himself as having a special mission, and indeed as bearing a
special responsibility. On several occasions he
castigated himself for not releasing the papers
earlier, observing that since he first brought
them to the attention of the (Senate) Foreign
Relations Committee, there had been "two invasions," more than 9,000 American lives lost, and
hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese deaths.
He also on several occasions had suggested
quite strongly that his actions will not only
alter the shape of the Vietnam war, but will
materially influence the conduct of our foreign
policy and the relationship between the people and
the government.
Ellsberg's reactions since emerging from seclusion have been illustrative. Initially there was
jubilation, an apparent enjoyment of the limelight. This was succeeded by a transient period
wherein there was a sense of quiet satisfaction,
of acceptance of his new-found stature, as if
personally significant actions had accomplished
what he sought to achieve.
3ut then, embittered that Congress and the
press had not wholeheartedly supported him, he
turned against them. This is not surprising,
for there would seem to be an insatiable qual-
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ity to Ellsberg's strong need for
success and
recognition, 14
Is

it going to too far an extreme to
claim to detect

within this report a trace of Murray's
conception of personality as •a full Congress of orators''
complete with
"Machiavels" and "Promethean revolutionists"?
Certainly
one can with relative ease translate the terms
of this

description into those of Murray's need system.
Consider,
for example, his (1938) break-down of the need for
super -

iority into need for achie vement— "wil

1

to power over

things, people, and ideas"— and the need for recognition^

"efforts to gain approval and high social status"

(p.

80),

The conceptualization of a life here, at very least,

falls clearly within the personalistic tradition: it is
dynamic, holistic, developmental, and suggestive of an

inner experience and deep subjectivity, all of which are

atypical of today's behavior ist formulations of personality.
The point of this extended line of speculation is
to suggest that if personalistic psychology is still

practiced, albeit outside academia, the paradigm itself
is perforce viable.

The practice of psychotherapy similarly supports the

viability of the personalistic paradigm. The adherence

^"Test of Study
ust 1973, P. 10.

on Ellsberg,

"

New York Times

,

3

Aug'

—
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after all these years of practitioners to
holistic and
dynamic formulations of personhood suggests
that such

formulations promote insight and understanding. Terms
and
concepts that have vanished from today's research—the
entire process of unconscious dynamics— still offer ill-

umination in contexts outside academic research departments. 1 ^

Additional support is found in the flourishing of
humanistic education centers within the past 10 or 15
years. Frequently influenced by Erikson, Mas low and
Rogers, these programs focus upon understanding and pro-

moting the richness of inner experience. Such programs
typically earn their share of condescension or scorn from
academic psychologists, who find the lack of rigorous,

quantitative methods objectionable. But the viewpoint

represented by such schools of education—of viewing the
person as the embodiment of a rich subjectivity— seems

sufficiently rewarding in its own terms to keep these
programs alive.
In a larger sense,

the realm of popular psychology

^Studies citing the inefficacy of psychotherapy
typically do so by employing criteria seemingly more a
reflection of the behaviorist paradigm than of the personalistic paradigm. Such studies do not, to my knowledge,
assess clinicians* insights and understandings as a
function of theoretical persuasions. Rather, such critiques generally attempt to concoct a quantified indicator
of successful-functioning behaviors.

—
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of bookstore Psychology-suggest,
the appeal of the personalistic world view. I cannot
summarize the gospel
according to the popular press, and
I am aware that in
these writings the reader is
sometimes invited to construe himself in metaphors every bit
as mechanical and
unpoetic as those academic psychologists
trade in, but
such books as Sheehy's Passages address
themselves to the

concerns of persons confused about, or interested
in, what
it means to be a person.

This is to say, perhaps, only that the puzzles the
old paradigm posed for itself are certainly posable still.

And to the extent that one can accept a certain illumination
of thought as a criterion of verification and validity,
the insights provided by some of these writers--and Maslow

and Rogers both have the readership to be included here

suggests that such puzzles are also solvable.
If the personalis^ ic personality paradigm did not

falter because of an autochthonous crisis, how is it that
the behaviorist personality paradigm replaced it? The

answer on one level is to be sought in transformations

taking place within psychology as a whole. The 1920

's

not an especially propitious time for the seeds of

ail

were

independent paradigm to sprout. The revolution in per-

sonality psychology was merely one aspect of the great
sweep of behaviorism. Being trained within the same institutions, a new generation of personality psychologists were

socialized into the presuppositions of the
behaviorist
paradigm.

Even if the new wave of personality psychologists

refused to accept the reductionist notion of an empty
organism, and even if they insisted upon postulating

"inner" personality variables, they accepted the formu-

lations of science itself which behaviorism brought

upon us.
What

I

am suggesting is an invisible revolution,

perhaps even a revolution from outside. 3y "invisible"
I

refer to a quite unknowing absorption of presuppositions.

One example has already been given,

that of the alteration

of psychology's definition into the science of behavior.
For reasons having nothing to do with the success
or failure of the new science of personality to solve its

contend, the science of psychology

paradigm puzzles,

I

during the 1920*

and 1930'

s

s

became increasingly the

property of behaviorism; and the psychologists who specialized in personality, we may assume, were socialized into
the same conception of science as were the psychologists

who went on to study reinforcement schedules or to look
for engrams.
In addition to being invisible, this revolution may

be perceived as imposed from the outside— depending upon

one's willingness to view the personalistic personality

psychologists as actually standing apart from the rest
certainly a
of psychology as a community of scholars,
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debatable point. If the point is granted,
one could speak
not of revolution of paradigms, but rather
of conquest.
Kuhn's evolutionary metaphor would seem in good
part

based upon the apparently dialectical process of
a field

responding to the crises its own progress generates.

If

the revolution be "imported," though, that dialectical

process might become entirely irrelevant to the establishment of the resulting paradigm, raising questions for any
<L

P r iori assertions about that new paradigm's evolutionary

or adaptive superiority.

The suggestion that the revolution of paradigms in

personality constitutes an "abnormal" scientific revolution, however intriguing, rests upon a moot point

— is

personality psychology outside the community of general
psychology

— and

will not be developed beyond noting an

especial danger of "imported" revolution. That

is,

an imposed

revolution could easily throw a field into maladaptive

relationship with its subject matter. That this might be
the case in personality psychology has already been sug-

gested by the discussion of the

Mischel controversy -'

'

recall the doubt cast upon the very reality of person-

ality variables that resulted from the difficulty of

reconciling them with the demands of a method based upon
the prediction of behavior.

.
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Personality psychology could, then, be
depicted as a
servant to two masters. On one hand are the
•'demands" of

the subject matter, the profound complexity
and depth of

personhood. On the other hand are the presuppositions

concerning method and science which severely restrict

what can be recognized as verifiable or real. One could
indeed argue that we have been forced to abandon those

qualities of the subject matter not treatable by our
method, and thus explain the superficiality of both cur-

rent research and the diminished model of personhood it
presupposes
But as we shall see in the next chapter, the change
of paradigm in personality psychology can be understood in

quite different terms, terms that suggest that the current

paradigm is not so entirely inappropriate to its subject
matter, human personality today.

Let me conclude this

chapter by noting that Kuhn's formulations, which have

enabled us to understand the current state of personality
psychology, are suggestive in other ways as well. They

offer a perspective for understanding the implications
for change and are suggestive in diagnosing our present

predicament as scientists and as persons. We shall turn now
to a consideration of what might be done to bring per-

sonality psychology into better days.
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CHAPTER

V

PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE MODERN WORLD:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHANGE

Having followed the argument this far, some readers

might question the necessity of employing Kuhn's model
of paradigm revolution, for criticisms of psychology

similar to those

I

am offering have been made on the

basis of psychology's philosophical presuppositions alone.
Many good critiques have laid the blame, as it were, upon
positivism, operationalism, and realism. Consider this

passage from Rychlak (1968) for example:
Idealism in the form stated at the outset
of this section is, if not unheard of, then
surely avoided in American psychology. This is
because psychology has been dominated by the
language of realism in academic circles since
the days of John B. Watson (1913). Indeed, his
revolt against introspectionism was in a sense
a reaction of realism (out there, in the hard
reality) to the prevailing idealism (in here,
the mind's eye). Over succeeding generations
American psychological journal articles have
been primarily occupied with problems of how
best to map reality "out there." Usually framed
in terms of lawfulness, we have shown great concern with measurements ("Let's make our maps
highly precise"), operational definitions ("Let's
get as close to reality as we can"), and reductionism ("Let's start with simple maps and
then work our way up"). Our "toughmindedness"
is tied to our realism.
pp. 19-20
The hidden presuppositions that structure how we as

,
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scientists perceive and research our subject
matter can be
discussed without employing Kuhn's specific
formulation of
paradigm. But Kuhn's model has implications
that are con-

venient and insightful, and it seems to me a
greater clarity
concerning psychology's present situation is enabled by
Kuhn's analytical system.
For the problem of transforming personality psychology,

Kuhn provides an understanding of the process

-of

change.

Once we identify the problem as one of maladaptive or, at
least, limiting paradigm, we are led to inquire how a

field might alter its paradigm.
To those psychologists who recognize the superfic-

iality of today's findings, who admit the triviality of
the great bulk of current research, but who feel the sol-

ution lies in "better research"
of linear,

— curvilinear

models instead

larger or repeated sampling of ever-increasing

numbers of variables instead of simple, bef ore-and-af ter
two variable designs

— Kuhn's

position suggests a disappoint-

ing picture. A science's paradigm is not capable of cor-

rection by the empirical research it gives rise to. As
Kuhn states, "Paradigms are not corrigible by normal
science at all" (1970a;

p.

122).

A paradigm whose presuppositions make the realities

of mental life invisible can hardly illuminate mental

108

life, however refined its
procedures. Earlier we discussed

paradigms by developing the
hypothetical example of the
extreme humanist and radical
behaviorist who both observe
the ••same" baby crying. In the
case of the radical behaviorist perspective-not to be
confused with the behaviorist
personality paradigm-it is easy to imagine
different
learning theories competing to explain
the organism.

Increasingly sophisticated research procedures
might support one over the others of such theories (we are
not

saying that theoretical formulations are not
corrigible
under normal science), but the behavioral presuppositions
are never transcended. And similarly among competing

humanist theories. Increasing ability to predict and control the crying behavior will never lead to the perception
of trust and agency. Increasing sensitivity to issues of

trust and agency will never lead to the perception of the
lawfulness of operants.
The point is certainly important: a paradigm is

incorrigible in terms of its own research. If the problem
is a matter of the paradigm itself, continuing with normal

research, or perfecting it, is rather pointless. Thus,
the first recommendation to be made on the basis of this

analysis is to discontinue current research practices.
If continuing with our present empirical research
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will not solve the crisis, what will? How
can we solve the
paradigm problem? What would be ideal is a
restitution of
the paradigm that was pushed aside with the
ascent of

behaviorism. This original paradigm was never brought to
full fruition. We might still learn about personality

through direct observations of individuals conceived holistically. The case study method has not yet yielded all
it might toward an understanding of personhood.

But how easily can a paradigm revolution be engin-

eered through the good intentions of psychologists armed

with a vision of a better science of personality? The
picture seems grim. To understand how the next paradigm

revolution might occur, we might look to the past for an

understanding of how the last paradigm revolution
occurred.
How is it that the behaviorist paradigm so thoroughly

captivated the field of psychology? The question is
thorny, and any attempt to answer it to the satisfaction
of all is probably doomed.

I

should like in this section

to address some issues that seem pertinent to understanding

our acquisition of the behaviorist paradigm, hoping to

shed light on the matter of change today.
The success of the behaviorist paradigm has been

explained in terms of its promise to make psychology a

valid science. Many writers have explained psychology's
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espousal of behaviorism in terms of psychologists' desire
to be as scientific as physicists.

"For many years,"

according to Deese (1972), "a large and active group
of psychologists worked hard to make psychology over
in the image of physics" (p. 3). According to Hudson

(1972):

Psychologists have a marginal position in
the academic community, poised near the borderline between the humane and the scientific
disciplines; we have a farouche professional
past, redolent of mesmerism, even of witch
doctoring; and there still exist widespread
misgivings--both in academic life and in
society at large about any attempt to
examine the mind's contents. Our response,
professionally, has been to over-reacts to
observe all the outward signs of scientific
respectability, taking as our model, incidentally, the Victorian conception of the
physical scientist, a model that physical
scientists have themselves abandoned.

—

p.

86

The implication that psychologists leapt to behav-

iorism because it assuaged their concern over not being
scientific suggests an incomplete picture, for it underplays the extent to which psychologists of the intro-

spectionist school saw themselves in their own terms as

adequately scientific, and, consequently, masks the presence of a conflict over the very nature of science.

Members of both schools could in good conscience

boast of scientific purity. And it is worthwhile to
point out that if from the behaviorist standpoint the

Ill

introspectionists were not psychologically
scientific

,

the

introspectionists considered the behavior is ts not

scientifically psychological

.

Robert Watson (1971),

the historian of psychology, gives this account
of

Titchener's view:
He shared Wundt's distaste for the applied
aspects of psychology. 3ehavior is not the
concern of a psychology of consciousness.
If experience is the sole concern of psychology,
then performance (behavior) is irrelevant.
Behavior is worthy of study--as a branch of
biology, not as psychology, Titchener objected
to what he called "the penny-in-the-slot
sort of science," in which consciousness is
said to be inferred, when it was always there
waiting to be interrogated. .. .Behaviorism,
which would see study of behavior as para-

mount, is logically irrelevant to psychology.
p.

*K)2

Because the introspectionists could see themselves as

adequately scientific, the conflict between schools was not
so much one between unscientific incumbents and rigorously

scientific hopefuls; rather, the conflict involved two

differing views of science. The behaviorist formulation

won the day, and its succession was couched in

the leg-

itimating language of greater scientific purity. But our

understanding of how today's paradigm came to power

will be inadequate if we leave it at the level of the
desire to seem scientific. We must question the specific

appeal of the behaviorist formulation of science over
the pre-existing formulation.
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Kuhn's discussion of the factors enabling scientists
to embrace a new paradigm suggests that appeals to empiri-

cal evidence or to purity of methods do not play deciding

roles, for both old and new paradigms define method and

can present evidence in a way that benefits itself while

damning the other:
When paradigms enter, as they must, into a
debate about paradigm choice, their role is
essentially circular. Each group uses its own
paradigm to argue in that paradigm's defense.
1970a; p. 9^

According to Kuhn, "this issue of paradigm choice can never
be unequivocally settled by logic and experimentation

alone" (p. 9*0

»

and even the techniques of pursuasive

argument must be recognized as important factors.
In this light,

the behavior ist paradigm's success

was possibly a function of its promis e. It is difficult

exactly to pinpoint the nature of this promise, but something of what

I

am getting at is reflected in ivlaslow's

early enthusiasm, previously quoted, which he described
in terms of "an explosion of excitement." Of course, not

everyone upon encountering J.B. Watson's program dances

down Fifth Avenue, but there was something about the

behaviorist world view that clicked, that caught on for
the time and place.

What was it about the behaviorist formulation that
made it so appealing to American psychologists? How can

t
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we understand the magnetic appeal
that enabled the para-

digm so strongly to establish itself
that it completely
dominated psychology? Was it Watson's own
skill
as an

advertiser, or something larger than one man's
compelling

writing style?
Rychlak (1968) suggests one line of argument with
his comment
At heart it is the imag e of man which is at
issue in psychology's internal conflict, let
us make no mistake about that. The arguments
all come down to this: How shall we theorize
about the human being?
P.

2

Can we understand the popularity of the behaviorist para-

digm in terms of the suitability of its image of man
for the time and place, American society since the 1920' s?

What is new about behaviorism is not the discovery
per se of laws of learning nor even the application of

such laws in contexts such as behavior modification}

circus trainers and factory owners have successfully

employed them for years. What is new is the model of the
person, the image of man it presents.

Paradigms in psychology do present society with an
image of man, and in order to bake root,

the paradigm

am indebted especially to Professor Howard Gadlin
whose lectures in systematic psychology have suggested the
general outline of this argument.
I
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must present an image congruent
with the needs and demands
of the larger society. Perhaps
this is only to say that
the world view of the paradigm must
be congruent with
the larger reality manufactured by
society, an argument
which requires essentially the integration of
the insights
of Berger and Luckmann's (1967) The Social
Construction of

Reality with those of Kuhn.
A connection that cannot be ignored,

I

am suggesting,

exists between the politics of paradigm change in psych-

ology and social forces in society. The case can be made
that in the period of time from, say, World War

I

to the

present, a shift in the meaning of personhood has been

mandated within American society, and this shift underlies the rise of behaviorism.

Stated simply, American society has witnessed a

dwindling of the richness of the inner experience of
selfhood, and this dwindling has been reflected in psych-

ological formulations that have promoted an ever more
shallow and superficial depiction of personhood.
>

If

I

may intrude upon a field not my own, this change

in the quality of personal life has been suggested directly

and indirectly in modern literature. Vonnegut (1975) is
one writer who claims for his profession a special

sensitivity to such changes:
All artists are specialized cells in a single,
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huge organism, mankind. Those
cells have to
behave as they do, just as the
cells in oS
hearts or our fingertips have to
behave as
they do.
We here are some of those specialized
cells.
Our purpose is to make mankind aware
of itself,
in all its complexity, and to dream
its dreams .
we have no choice in the matter.
p.

228

A succinct statement of the condition of man
in modern
society is given in Leonard Michaels' s recent review
of
Peter Handke* s A Moment of True Feeling , which
appeared
in the New York Times 's Book Review recently:
The Austrian, Peter Handke, who writes
poetry, plays and memoirs, is concerned with
a familiar subject— the loss of authenticity
or innocence. For Handke, this loss characterizes modern life. He thinks we no longer
experience things directly, no longer truly
feel. All our experience is mediated by cultural formulae, established ideas, cliches of
language and manners. Hence, we are alienated
from ourselves and left only with the knowledge
that everything valuable is gone.

July 31, 1977; p. 7

Michaels 's description of this subject as "familiar" would

seem to speak for itself.
The sociologist Max Weber's conception of rational-

ization of society has provided me with a model for under-

standing what societal forces possibly lie behind the rise
of the behavior ist paradigm. Weber, who is especially

esteemed for his sociological analysis of bureaucracies,
saw rationalization as a process accounting for the basic

drift of Western civilization. According to Robert Nisbet
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(1976), Professor in the Humanities at Columbia, Weber's

concept can be summarized as follows:
Basically, rationalization is, in Weber's
sense of the word, the imposition of strict
means-end criteria not only upon thought
itself but upon art, science, culture, government, war, even religion.
It implies the
exclusion from thought or act of all that is
purely traditional, charismatic, or ritualistic,
all, in short, that is not directly related
to the means necessary to efficient realization
of a given end. Since reason teaches us that
the shortest distance between two points is a
straight line, rationalization is the process
through which we seek, as it were, a straight
line, and, thereby, avoid or exclude all that
is indirect or circuitous. Weber came to believe
that from the late Middle Ages on, more and more
areas of Western Culture, beginning with government and finance, had become subject to the
canons of rationalization, thus promoting what
he called, in a phrase borrowed from the poet
Schiller, "the disenchantment of the world."
pp.

111-112

Weber saw in the monopolistic imposition of rational

principles and means-ends relationships in the place of
traditional, sacred, and folk ways a disenchantment, a
loss of magic and poetry. This sense of loss of magic

and poetry captures my own estimation of the changes in
personhood. Rationalization has caught up with selfhood,
and the rise of the behaviorist paradigm is an expression
of it. What has taken place is a disenchantment of
self.

Some of the early personality psychologists per-

ceived in behaviorist psychology the connection with an
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increasingly impoverished
societal conception of personhood.
Consider this statement of
Allporti
e

^^

a
air t0
^
in psychology and

blame the Positivist
social science for
the present plight of mankind,
although many
critics do so. Positivism is more a
reflection
than a cause of the fragmentation
of personality in the modern world.
196li p. 552

™ti™£
outlook

Henry Murray, in several instances, has shown
that
he, too, was onto the scent.

In his Explorations in

Personality we find the following included as a footnote
to his discussion of the peripheralists in psychology,

those researchers in quest of data that can be cast in

statistical terms 1
This may be regarded, perhaps, as one of many
manifestations of a general disposition which
is widespread in America, namely, to regard
the peripheral personality— conduct rather than
inner feeling and intention as of prime importance. Thus, we have a fabrication of a 'pleasing
personality, mail order courses in comportment, courtesy as good business, the best pressed
clothes, the best barber shops, Listerine and
deoderants, the contact man, friendliness without
friendship, the prestige of movie stars and
Big Business, quantity as an index of worth, a
compulsion for fact getting, the statistical
analysis of everything, questionnaires and
behaviorism.

—

1

P.

9

This association of behaviorism with Listerine and

deoderants, with contact men and "friendliness without

friendship" so characteristic of sales relationships
(and, too often,

of collegial relationships in academic

—

:
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departments 1 ") bespeaks the connection between society and
psychology's change of paradigm.
What

I

am suggesting is that American society "needed"

or was ready for an image of personhood like
that pro-

moted by the behaviorist paradigm; externalistic, superficial, mindless. Let us again attend to Henry Murray
(19^0)
on the topic

Americans have fashioned a cosmetic culture,
in which a pleasing appearance at quick contacts
is the thing that counts. It pays so we are told
to be washed, shaved, manicured, deodorized,
tailored (cleanliness is next to godliness), and
to smile, smile, smile (agreableness is next to
cleanliness). It is the day of Life Click Look
and Peek , of instantaneous effects, candid photography, voyeurism and exhibitionism. A successful
personality can be bought (and paid for). The
camera makes the man. If you want to be President,

—

,

,

'In the fiction of Updike is a passage which, while
making again the point about the change in personhood in
relation to modern life, hits rather close to home:
"I have the impression, at any rate, that he, as is
often the case with scientists and Midwesterners, had no
use for religion, and I saw in him a typical specimen of
the new human species that thrives around scientific
centers, in an environment of discussion groups, outdoor
exercise, and cheerful husbandry. Like those vanished
gentlemen whose sexual energy was exclusively spent in
brothels, these men confine their cleverness to their
work, which, being in one way or another for the government, is usually secret. With their sufficient incomes,
large families, Volkswagen buses, hi-fi phonographs,
half-remodelled Victorian homes, and harassed, ironical
wives, they seem to have solved, or dismissed, the paradox of being a thinking animal and, devoid of guilt,
apparently participate not in this century but in the
next." -"The Music School," p. 139.
^

,
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there are agencies ready to take
milking Bossy and kissing chubby your picture
chUdrenTto
cam P al en and write sure-fire speeches
ll^t
lease ever y° n e (and no one). (What
?
?5
A
e
ett burg address had been put together
i;
Vl
5
on Broadway?) Our civilization is
skin deep, and
the best epidermis triumphs. This is all
part and
parcel of the race for goods, comfort, and social
recognition. It is the ideology of big business,
now well established in our universities!
productivity en masse , the mechanical advance of mediocrity. The wheels turn and psychology is caught
upt it takes its place on the assembly line.
Move on there 1 This is no place for rumination*
Get busy with the calculator and hand in your
results i Who is not familiar with this treadmill?
and with the deadening consequences of it? Superficiality is the great sin of American personology.
It suits the tempo of the times
it suits
industry and commerce it suits our interest in
appearances it suits our boyish optimism. And
it suits the good heart of America, its Rotarian
solidarity, its will-to-agree, since it is easier
to agree about the surface than about the depths.
Perhaps there are no depths. Who knows? There are
no depths. Since truth is congenial fiction, and
this fiction is most congenial, this is truth.
It is no mute thing that the inventor of behaviorism found his destiny in the advertising business.

lun

^

j

;

j

P. 175

The behavior ist paradigm is, so to speak, as American as

mass-produced, mass-marketed, artificially flavored apple
pie.
If we accept the argument that paradigms are societally

responsive, what are the implications for paradigm change

today? Can we expect change to come about in response to
cogent criticisms, and continually advance the publication
dates of the argument first made by Allport and Murray,
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then later by Maslow and, more recently still,
Carlson?
While the attempt is undoubtedly noble, it is, at
the same
time, typically frustrated. The would-be reformer is in

the position of the pawn on the chess board who discovers

that his fate is not, as he thought, in the hands of the

king and queen, but rather in the hand behind the board.
The imagery of the chess board suggests

ray

position

that the relationship between society and psychology's

paradigm is essentially one-way. As society changes, so
does psychology's paradigm. Can we argue the case for a

two-way relationship, wherein psychology as a field is
depicted as influencing society through the production of

personality models which become increasingly realized in
the actual population? Does the image of man presented by

academic psychology serve as an influence to create such

men in the real world? Has, for example, the thinking of
Skinner influenced the man on the street to regard himself
in Skinnerian terms and possibly become a congeries of

behavior with a reinforcement history?
The question is intriguing. My own answer is a quali-

fied no.

I

do not believe that present day academic

psychology is in the Mephistophelean business of creating
through influence upon the public the kinds of persons
that society needs.

I

think not, simply because the vast

majority of our work exists in remotest isolation from the
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everyday awareness of the general public.
Most Americans
have not the vaguest idea of what academic
psychologists
are up to.
But my -no" is qualified, for there is one
group

extremely prone to such influence, and they, of course,
are psychologists themselves.
Unless he is extremely cynical or capable of depositing
his intellectual schema at the office door when retiring

from his workday, the personality psychologist inevitably employs his constructs for making sense of himself,
his associates close and casual, and his world. How can it
be otherwise? Like every serious scientist, he likes to

believe his constructs are the best available and, so to
speak, the truest. And just as a scientific discipline's

basic reality derives from its paradigm presuppositions, so

might it be argued that the individual's personal reality,
including his inner experience as well as his conception
of the meaning of being alive, similarly reflects the con-

structs available to him.
In the field of personality psychology today there

exists an occupational hazard, and that hazard concerns
the depth and quality of one's personal experience. Today's

model of the person, that consortium of dispositions,
either consistent or situationally specific, that soulless

intersection of rating dimensions, that predictable, deter-
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mined machine, threatens to overtake and
become us. We
run a risk of believing ourselves the experiential zombies, the emotionally shallow creatures that
march over

the statistics of our journals. We run a risk to the
extent

that we strive in our own lives to fit our personalities
into the molds required to maintain our allegiance to
our own modern paradigm.

.

.
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